German social preferences towards Turkey's EU accession by Gerenli, Fatma
 GERMA SOCIAL PREFERECES TOWARDS TURKEY’S EU ACCESSIO 
 
 
 
 
by 
FATMA GERELĐ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate School of Arts and Social Sciences 
in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts in European Studies 
 
Sabancı University 
Fall 2009 
 
 
 

 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Fatma Gerenli 2010 
All Rights Reserved 
 iv 
 
 
GERMAN SOCIAL PREFERENCES TOWARDS TURKEY’S EU ACCESSION 
 
By Fatma Gerenli 
European Studies, M.A. Thesis, 2010 
Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
Key Words: liberal intergovernmentalism, constructivism, social preferences, political 
parties, public opinion. 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempts to explain the social preferences in Germany towards Turkey’s EU 
membership, the factors that shape these preferences and their relative impact on 
Turkish accession. The major political parties and the public are identified as two 
significant domestic groups whose preferences influence the national position on 
Turkey. Particularly, the impact of SPD, CDU/CSU, the Greens and FDP is substantial 
in this respect. The public impact is more limited and indirect. The attitude of these 
domestic groups is shaped by material and identity-based concerns over Turkish 
membership. The major political parties tend to assess Turkish accession in terms of the 
security and economic benefits it will bring to the EU. The material benefits of Turkey’s 
inclusion are the primary determinants which shape the position of the social democrats, 
the Greens and the liberals. On the other hand, the identity and culture based concerns 
influence the stance of CDU/CSU. The public attitude is mainly determined by the 
perceived economic and cultural threats posed by Turkey’s membership. Particularly, 
the perceived cultural differences between Turkey and the EU member states play an 
important role in the increasing public opposition against Turkish accession. 
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TÜRKĐYE’NĐN AB ÜYELĐĞĐ VE ALMANYA: ALMAN TOPLUMUNUN BAKIŞI  
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Avrupa Çalışmaları, M.A. Tezi, 2010 
Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: liberal hükümetlerarası teori, yapısalcılık, toplumsal tercihler, 
siyasi partiler, kamuoyu. 
ÖZET 
Bu tez Türkiye’nin AB üyeliği konusunda Almanya’daki toplumsal tercihleri, bu 
tercihlerin oluşumunda rol oynayan faktörleri ve bu faktörlerin Türkiye’nin AB’ye 
katılımı üzerindeki görece etkilerini açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Almanya’nın bu 
konudaki tutumunu belirleyen belli başlı toplumsal gruplar arasında önemli siyasi 
partiler ve kamuoyu ön plana çıkmaktadır. Önemli siyasi partiler ve kamuoyunun 
tercihleri uzun vadede Almanya’nın Türkiye’ye yönelik tutumunu etkilemekte ve 
yönledirmektedir. Özellikle, SPD, CDU/CSU, Yeşiller ve FDP gibi siyasi partilerin bu 
konudaki etkisi oldukça büyüktür. Kamuoyu bu konuda daha sınırlı ve dolaylı bir etkiye 
sahiptir. Siyasi partilerin ve kamuoyunun Türkiye’ye yönelik tercihlerinin 
şekillenmesinde güvenlik ve ekonomiye dayalı beklentiler ve kültürel eksenli endişeler 
rol oynamaktadır. Siyasi partiler, Türkiye’nin üyeliğini değerlendirirken bu üyeliğin 
Avrupa güvenliğine ve ekonomisine sağlayacağı kazançları göz önüne alma 
eğilimindedirler. Türkiye üyeliğinin getireceği maddi kazançlar Sosyal Demokratların, 
Yeşillerin ve Liberallerin Türkiye’ye yönelik tutumlarını belirlemede öncelikli rol 
oynamaktadır. Öte yandan, CDU/CSU’nun bu konudaki tutumunu kültür ve kimlik 
eksenli endişeler şekillendirmektedir. Kamuoyu ise Türkiye’nin AB üyeliğini hem 
maddi hem de kültürel bir tehdit olarak algılamakta ve bu tehdit algısı kamuoyunun bu 
konudaki tutumunu belirlemektedir. Özellikle, Türkiye ve AB üye devletleri arasındaki 
kültürel farklılıklar kamuoyunun Türkiye’nin AB üyeliğine yönelik muhalif bir tutum 
takınmasında etkili olmaktadır.  
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ITRODUCTIO 
Since the 1963 Ankara Treaty, the attempts of Turkey to become an EU member 
have continued. In 1959, following Greece, Turkey applied for the European Economic 
Community membership. The answer from Brussels was neither absolutely positive nor 
negative. Brussels did not reject the application, however based on the argument that the 
EEC and Turkey were not yet ready for a full membership, it offered an association 
agreement to Turkey and Greece which would eventually lead to a full membership. 
Article 28 of the agreement laid the legal ground that if Turkey ‘fulfilled the obligations 
arising out of the Treaty”, the possibility of its membership to the EC would be 
examined by the member states.1  
 
In 1987, another historic step was taken when Turkey officially applied to the 
EC for full membership. However, the Commission Opinion in 1989 was not much 
different than the 1959 Brussels opinion when the Commission recommendation to the 
Council was to revitalize the Association Agreement since neither the EC nor Turkey 
was yet ready for a full-membership. In 1995, another significant development took 
place when Turkey concluded the Customs Union Agreement, the preceding step before 
the full membership as so anticipated in the Ankara Agreement. After this development, 
Turkey had to wait until the 1999 Helsinki Summit where it was finally granted the 
candidate status. Eventually, in 2005, nearly 50 years after the first application of 
Turkey to become a member to the EEC, the accession negotiations were started. 
According to the negotiating framework, which was laid after the opening of accession 
negotiations, Turkey is required to implement the acquis communitaire fully by 
completing 35 chapters that were specified in the framework. So far only one chapter 
was successfully closed.  
 
                                                 
1 Ankara Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Economic 
Community and Turkey. Article 28.  
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The ultimate result of the negotiations is not definite; because the EU reiterated 
several times that it is an open-ended process, which may not result in full-membership. 
That is, even if all of the chapters are closed, the outcome of the negotiations will not be 
determined by fulfilling the required criteria and implementing the acquis alone, but 
other factors will be influential, too. The key factor will be the stance of the member 
states towards Turkey, because the decisions on enlargement are taken with unanimous 
voting at the European Council, where the member states are the ultimate decision-
makers. The preferences of member states towards Turkey will determine the direction 
for Turkey’s long way towards Europe. 
 
This thesis aims to analyze the social preference formation towards Turkey’s EU 
bid in Germany and argue that the domestic preferences in Germany have an impact on 
Turkey’s EU membership. The literature on the EU-Turkey relations mostly deals with 
the state-level preference formation in the member states. However, the domestic 
preference formation in individual member states in terms of Turkey’s EU accession is 
not widely studied. The thesis aims to contribute to the literature by its analysis of social 
preferences in one of the largest member states in the EU. Germany’s support for 
Turkish membership is crucial, because it is one of the largest member states and has 
relative influence over other member states through its economic power. However, the 
current German position towards Turkish accession is marked by opposition. Contrary 
to its supportive attitude before the late 1980s, Germany has been rather skeptical on 
Turkey’s accession. This change in Germany’s attitude has been determined mainly by 
the increasing opposition of the domestic groups against Turkey’s EU bid. Therefore, 
Germany forms a good case study to investigate the influence of domestic groups on 
national preference formation in terms of Turkish membership and analyze the 
determinants which affect the preference formation among these groups.  
 
The relations between Turkey and Germany date back to the 19th century to the 
Ottoman Era. The relationship between these two countries started with the exchange of 
experts in military and civil administration, and developed into an alliance in World 
War I. After the foundation of the Republic in 1923, the relationship has continued in 
different ways. During the Cold War, Turkey was considered to be an indispensable part 
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of the Western security system, and this role of the country was of special importance 
for the Federal Republic of Germany, one of the front-line states of the Cold War. 
Starting in 1960s, another development took place which has had a great impact in 
shaping the German-Turkish relations.  This development was the migration of a large 
Turkish population to Germany as Gastarbeiter (guest-worker) after the conclusion of a 
recruitment treaty between West Germany and Turkey in October 1961.  
 
Both during the Ottoman Empire and the Republican Era, the relationship 
between Turkey and Germany was defined as ‘friendly.  However, in the recent 
decades, with the growing Turkish population in Germany and Turkey’s EU bid, the 
trajectory of this relationship has taken a slightly different turn. Even though, there was 
no overt opposition to Turkey’s EU bid until the late 1980s, with the chancellorship of 
Kohl and the rise of the Christian Democrats to power in coalition with the Free 
Democrats, the opposition to a possible Turkish entry to the EU has become more 
manifest. The rhetoric of the political party leaders and the public opinion polls 
demonstrate this trend very much.  
 
The social preference formation is under the influence of various groups. These 
groups can be categorized as political parties, social classes, interest groups, legislators 
and the public.2 Within the framework of this thesis, two of these domestic determinants 
in Germany, the political parties and the public will be examined. There is an obvious 
divide among these groups on the Turkish issue. Whereas one side fiercely opposes the 
country’s membership to the EU, the other side supports it. This trend can be examined 
by looking at the rhetoric of the party leaders and members and the public opinion polls 
conducted by the EU. 
 
                                                 
2 Putnam, Robert. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Game.” 
Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. Eds. 
Robert Putnam, et al. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. p. 435. 
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In terms of the political parties, the largest divide is between the Social 
Democrats, which are represented by SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany), and 
the Greens, and Christian Democrats represented by CDU (Christian Democratic Union 
of Germany) and CSU (Bavarian Christian Social Union) and to some extent the FDP 
(Free Democratic Party). While the Social Democrats and the Greens support Turkey’s 
full membership to the Union, CDU/CSU fiercely oppose full-membership, and are 
more supportive of a ‘privileged partnership’ instead. The FDP does not have a clear-
cut position towards Turkey. It neither openly supports the Turkish membership like 
SPD and the Greens, nor opposes it as rigidly as  CDU/CSU. The rhetoric of the 
political party leaders and party members has made this attitude most obvious. The SPD 
leaders such as Schroeder often made statements in favor of Turkey; the CDU leader 
Angela Merkel has followed the lead of her predecessor Helmut Kohl, and so far made 
statements against Turkey’s EU bid and argued that full-membership is not a reasonable 
option in the Turkish case, but the relations should continue in the form of a ‘privileged-
partnership’. 
 
A similar divide exists among the public on Turkey’s EU bid. While some 
portions of the public support Turkey’s EU accession in line with the SPD and the 
Greens, other parts are in great opposition like the CDU/CSU. The public opinion polls 
conducted by the European Commission, along with some nation-wide surveys 
demonstrate that the opposition to a possible Turkish EU membership has increased. 
The proportion of the public that is concerned and suspicious of a Turkish membership 
has far exceeded the proportion that supports Turkey’s EU bid.  
 
The reasons for support and opposition are driven by various determinants. 
Firstly, there is great concern about the possibility of another immigration wave from 
Turkey. The fear of immigration has both economic and social implications. 
Considering the rising level of unemployment in Germany, especially after the German 
Reunification in 1990, the possibility of immigration from Turkey has been a source of 
concern among the public. In addition to a flux of workers who may have an impact on 
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the job market and the social welfare system, the fear of immigration also adds to the 
level of perceived cultural threat among the public.3 The large number of Turkish 
population living in Germany is another determinant which influences the public 
preference formation. The reasons of opposition and support for Turkey’s EU bid are 
both utility-driven and identity-based at the public level and the political party level. 
Indeed, these two domestic groups are in a constant interaction, and the opinion of one 
group on the Turkish issue is bound to be influenced by the other group, and vice versa. 
The rhetoric of the political party leaders and members influence the preference 
formation among the public, and the preference of the public, i.e. domestic voters, has 
an impact on the political parties through elections. 
 
This thesis is mainly composed of four chapters. The first chapter will provide a 
general theoretical framework and define concepts which will be repeatedly used 
throughout the thesis. Liberal intergovernmentalism and constructivism will be the form 
the main theoretical foundation of this study. The stance of the political parties and the 
public opinion towards Turkey’s accession will be analyzed from both the liberal 
intergovernmentalist account and the constructivist approach. These two approaches 
will be discussed in the first chapter.  
 
The second chapter will present a brief history of the German-Turkish relations. 
The course of the relations starting from the late 19th century to the recent years will be 
analyzed. Major international developments played an important role in determining the 
relations of Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic with Europe in general and 
Germany in particular. Therefore while analyzing the relationship between these 
countries, international context will be taken into consideration. The analysis of 
historical relations between Germany and Turkey will enforce a more comprehensive 
understanding of the current determinants shaping this relationship.  
 
                                                 
3 McLaren, Lauren. “Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU.” 
European Union Politics. 8.2 (2007): 258.  
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In the third chapter, the social preference formation at the political party level 
will be discussed in detail. The rhetoric of the party leaders and members provides 
tangible resource in defining the preference at this level. Therefore, the speeches and 
statements of the party leaders and important opinion makers will be elaborated. The 
division among the political parties on the Turkish issue will be analyzed in depth in 
relation to the decisions made during the rule of each party. The stance of the major 
parties which have conflicting approaches to the Turkish issue will be defined. In 
addition to statements and decisions related to Turkey’s EU bid, some major decisions 
of the political parties on the existing Turkish community in Germany will be 
examined.  
 
The final chapter will endeavor to explain the preference formation at the public 
level. Both the utility-driven and identity-based determinants of the preference 
formation will be analyzed in detail. The economic and social implications of a possible 
wave of immigration will be argued in relation with the threat perception among the 
public. The impacts of the existing Turkish population in Germany on the preference 
formation at the public level will be discussed. The public opinion polls conducted by 
the European Commission will provide the main sources for the analysis of the public 
preferences on this issue. 
  7 
CHAPTER I 
Theoretical Premises of German Preferences 
The European integration is mainly driven by the EU member states. The 
domain of the supranational institutions is rather limited, mostly to issues of low 
politics, such as trade and agriculture. The integration in terms of “high politics” is 
controlled by the individual member states.4 The relative influence of the nation-state on 
the European integration has been discussed since the onset of the integration. Neo-
functionalism and intergovernmentalism are the main European integration theories 
which question the impact of the nation state on the integration.   
 
According to neo-functionalism, which was the prominent European integration 
theory from the late 1950s to the early 1970s5, as the European integration deepened, 
the states would no longer be the sole authority in giving direction to the integration, but 
the transnational interest groups and supranational authority would be the main actors.6 
For neo-functionalists, the states would forego their competence in making decisions 
                                                 
4 Hoffman, Stanley. “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case 
of the Western Europe.” The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of 
European Integration. Ed. Nelsen, Brent F. and Alexander Stubb. Boulder, Colo. : L. 
Rienner, 2003. p. 170. 
 
5 Rosamond, Ben. Theories of European Integration. New York: St. Martins Press, 
2000. p. 54. 
 
6 Haas, Ernst. “The Uniting of Europe.” The European Union: Readings on the Theory 
and Practice of European Integration. Ed. Nelsen, Brent F. And Alexander Stubb. 
Boulder, Colo. : L. Rienner, 2003. p. 147.; Lindberg; Leon. “Political Integration: 
Definitions and Hypotheses.” The European Union: Readings on the Theory and 
Practice of European Integration. p. 155.  
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related to integration by transferring power to supranational authorities when they were 
confronted with complex problems.7 Neo-functionalism was formulated in the golden 
age of supranational authority which was on the rise during 1950s and early 1960s. 
Therefore, it provided a “plausible account” for the European integration at the time.8 
Nevertheless, later developments refuted the major claim of neo-functionalism. 
It has become more evident that the national states remained to be the main actors in the 
integration process. Starting with the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965, developments like 
Luxembourg Compromise in 1966, the formation of the European Council in 1974 
confirmed the supremacy of the states repeatedly. The developments showed that 
“cooperation was possible among sovereign states, but only when it was in their own 
interest; the member states were quick to halt or reverse integration when it no longer 
met their needs.”9 Taking into consideration the insufficiency of neo-functionalism to 
provide an explanation for these developments, another theory with a new configuration 
of the relative power of the decision-making bodies in the EU was required. Liberal 
intergovernmentalism was the theory that filled this gap. The explanatory power of 
liberal intergovernmentalism vis-à-vis other theories rests with its inclusion of the state-
level in explaining the European integration and its emphasis on state actors. 
 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism: 
 
The core argument of intergovernmentalism, that the states are the main actors in 
decision-making in the EU, lies in the realist theories of the international relations and 
from this aspect Moravcsik’s approach can be compared to the rational 
intergovernmentalist approach, which was introduced by Stanley Hoffman in 1966. 
Rational intergovernmentalism claims that states are the main actors in driving the 
                                                 
7 Rosamond, Ben. Theories of European Integration. p. 59. 
 
8 Ibid. p. 72. 
9 Moravcsik, Andrew. “The Choice for Europe.” in The European Union: Readings on 
the Theory and Practice of European Integration. ed. by Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander 
Stubb. Boulder, Colo. : L. Rienner, 2003. p. 239. 
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European integration. The decisions with respect to European integration are taken and 
the national preferences are through strategic bargaining at the state level.10 However, 
Moravcsik’s theory differs from classical intergovernmentalism exactly at this point. In 
contrast to the state-centrism of classical intergovernmentalism, liberal 
intergovernmentalism introduces a second level, the societal level, in preference 
formation. From this perspective, liberal intergovernmentalism also takes from the 
liberal theories of international relations in that it stresses the impact of societal groups 
in defining the national preferences. While adding the societal level to the preference 
formation, Moravcsik builds on Putnam’s two-level game analogy. Putnam argues that 
“at the national level domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the 
government to adopt favorable policies”, and the governments aim at realizing the 
domestically defined interests at the international level.11 In this sense, liberal 
intergovernmentalism has a two-tiered approach to European integration.  
 
The first level is comprised of the intergovernmental account which is based on 
the assumption that states are the main actors in EU integration. State actions are 
“purposively directed toward the achievement of a set of consistently ordered goals or 
objectives.”12 According to intergovernmentalism, states are motivated by their 
objective of furthering their material interests. Therefore while explaining integration; 
the intergovernmentalist approach posits the convergence of material interests as the 
driving force. Material interests, both economic and security interests have always been 
at the center of the integration. Moravcsik defines integration as “the policy response of 
modern welfare states to rising economic interdependence.”13 The states agree to 
                                                 
10  Nelsen, Brent F. And Alexander Stubb eds. The European Union: Readings on the 
Theory and Practice of European Integration. Boulder, Colo. : L. Rienner, 2003. p. 164. 
 
11 Putnam, Robert. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games.” in Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Process. 
p. 436. 
 
12 Moravcsik, Andrew. “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach.”,Journal of Common Market Studies. 31.4 (1993): 476. 
 
13 Ibid. p. 481. 
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integrate further as long as it creates material gains or maintains the status quo. The 
decisions to widen or deepen integration are all bound by the cost-benefit calculations 
of the member states.  
 
States pursue their material interests at the interstate bargaining table. The 
relative bargaining power of the member states is determined by the intensity of their 
preferences.14 As a result, the relative bargaining power of each member state is 
redefined according to the issue dealt with. Moravcsik lists three determinants that 
influence the relative bargaining power of the states. The first is the unilateral policy 
agreements, i.e. threats of non-agreement. When the status quo in a member state 
constituted a better alternative than the benefits an agreement would bring, the member 
state is more likely to reject the agreement.15 
 
The second determinant is forming alternative coalitions and the threat of 
exclusion. This type of determinant is influential, when the interests of two or more 
states converge on a specific issue, and they want to form an alternative coalition to 
conclude an agreement on it. In such cases, the other states face the threat of exclusion, 
and this situation increases the relative bargaining power of the states who are party to 
the alternative coalition.16  
 
The third determinant is the “compromise, side-payment and package deals”17. 
Package deals usually takes place when “when two countries have highly asymmetrical 
interests in various issues which permit each to make concessions valuable to the other 
at relatively low cost”. In package deals, several issues are linked together to an 
                                                 
14 Ibid.  
 
15 Ibid. p. 476. 
 
16 Ibid. 
17 Moravcsik, Andrew. “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach.” p. 476. 
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agreement, and nearly each member state finds the agreement favorable in some aspect. 
However, whereas package deals are important in that they provide a middle ground to 
conclude an agreement, since they have “important domestic distributional 
consequences”, they also “create winners and losers in all countries that are party to 
them”18.  
 
In all these bargaining situations, the larger states are more advantageous. The 
larger states are advantageous in situations when there is a threat of non-agreement, 
because being “prosperous” and “relatively self-sufficient”, they do not gain as much as 
the “smaller, poorer, more open neighbors” from the agreement. Likewise, when there 
is a threat of exclusion from an alternative coalition, larger states are at an advantage, 
since their participation is essential for a “viable coalitions”19. Consequently, when the 
EU is considered, states like Germany, France and United Kingdom, are deemed to be 
more advantageous in interstate bargaining than smaller member states. 
 
So far the influence of the member states in the policy formation in the EU is 
analyzed. As for the supranational institutions, Moravcsik explains their role using the 
functional regime theory and defines the institutions as “passive, transaction-cost 
reducing sets of rules”20. In contrast to neofunctionalism, the supranational institutions 
are not the main actors in the interstate bargaining and policy formation in the EU, but 
they complement the states by providing “domestic legitimacy and credibility to 
member state initiatives”, and they help the governments to “overcome domestic 
opposition”. The governments also use the supranational institutions as “scapegoats for 
unpopular policies or undemocratic processes”21. However the role of the supranational 
institutions in intergovernmentalism is certainly not limited to the abovementioned 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
 
19 Ibid. 
 
20 Ibid.  p. 508. 
 
21 Ibid. p. 516. 
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functions. The governments delegate their power to make ad hoc decisions on certain 
issues to semi-autonomous central institutions. In addition to delegation, states pool 
their sovereignty through qualified majority voting, making collective control over 
certain issues possible.  However, governments only delegate power to supranational 
institutions or pool their sovereignty only when such decisions are not likely to produce 
consequences against their interests.22  
 
The second tier of liberal intergovernmentalism is the societal level preference 
formation. In this level, multiple domestic groups with divergent interests bargain with 
each other to influence the national preference formation. The preference formation at 
the societal level is not much different from the state level in the sense that it happens as 
a result of strategic bargaining. Similar to the relative bargaining power of the states, the 
bargaining leverage of the societal groups stems from their “identity”, “the nature of 
their interests” and “their relative influence on domestic policy”23. Liberal 
intergovernmentalism argues that these societal groups form pressure on national 
governments both at the national level and the international level. At level I, different 
societal groups with divergent interests compete to influence the preference formation 
in favor of their benefit. Then the national preferences defined domestically are 
bargained at the international level. At this level the governments are compelled to 
conclude an agreement that will satisfy the domestic groups. In short, “groups articulate 
preferences; and governments aggregate them.”24 Consequently, “governments 
participating in international negotiations are both empowered and constrained by 
important societal groups, which calculate their interests in terms of the expected gains 
and losses from specific policies.”25 The societal groups define a “bargaining space” for 
the governments. When the costs and benefits of an agreement are important and risky; 
                                                 
22 Moravcsik, Andrew. “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach.” p.511. 
 
23 Ibid.  p. 483. 
 
24 Ibid. 
 
25 Ibid. p.487 
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the governments have a rather limited bargaining space at the international level. 
However, when these costs and benefits are “ambiguous, insignificant and the risk is 
low”, the governments have a more flexible bargaining space. The governments are 
constrained by the domestic groups, because they have to satisfy the interests of these 
groups to stay in office, otherwise they risk the possibility of being re-elected. 
 
The primary interest of governments is to maintain themselves in office; 
in democratic societies, this requires the support of a coalition of 
domestic voters, parties, interest groups and bureaucracies, whose views 
are transmitted, directly or indirectly, through domestic institutions and 
practices of political representation.26 
 
The influence of the domestic groups on national level preference formation is 
the most conspicuous feature of liberal intergovernmentalism which distinguishes it 
from both neofunctionalism and rational intergovernmentalism. The increasing 
opposition to Turkey’s membership in member states like Germany, France and Austria 
cannot be interpreted only through institutional or state-level explanations. Turkey’s full 
membership to the EU is still ambivalent, even after it has implemented many reforms 
to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria. Indeed, it is mentioned repeatedly that the 
negotiations is an open-ended process and even if Turkey fulfills all the criteria, it may 
not be granted full-membership. Some member states, namely France and Austria, 
declared that even if an accession agreement is prepared, their decision on Turkey’s 
entry will be determined after a referendum in these countries. Turkey’s role as an asset 
for European security structure is still preeminent, especially for energy security and the 
country’s role as a mediator in the Middle East and Caucasus.27 Turkey’s economy has 
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also proven to survive within a free market28, and it was mentioned in a Commission 
Progress Report that Turkey was a “functioning market economy”29. The state level 
approaches fall short of providing an explanation for the increasing opposition towards 
Turkey’s EU bid at the domestic level. Therefore, liberal intergovernmentalism was 
chosen as the fundamental theory within the framework of this thesis, since the thesis 
aims to analyze the domestic level of preference formation in Germany. The political 
party level and public level support and opposition to Turkey’s EU entry in Germany 
will be examined using liberal intergovernmentalism. The first proposition of this thesis 
is that the perceived material interests of Turkey’s inclusion will influence German 
domestic preferences, and domestic preferences will shape Turkey’s accession. 
 
However, the material interests are not the sole determinants that shape the 
attitude of the domestic groups. The identity-based concerns also impact the preferences 
of the societal groups. The compatibility of Turkey with the European identity and 
culture is a deep concern especially for the public. Therefore, the liberal 
intergovernmentalism is insufficient to provide a comprehensive explanation for 
domestic level preference formation, because it only focuses on the material interests of 
the domestic groups in analyzing their preferences. It falls short of explaining the 
concern of the domestic groups about Turkey’s possible impact on European collective 
identity. In order to make a thorough analysis of German social preference formation 
towards Turkey’s EU membership, liberal intergovernmentalism should be 
complemented with another theory which provides identity-based explanations to 
European integration. Therefore, constructivism will form the second theoretical pillar 
of this thesis, especially in analyzing the public opinion in Germany on the Turkish 
issue.  
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Constructivism: 
 
As stated above, the utility-driven concerns of the domestic groups are not the 
only factors that shape their preferences. The fact that Turkey is different from the EU 
member states in terms of culture and identity also constitutes a great concern for the 
majority of the public. Turkey’s membership is perceived as a threat to the European 
identity and culture. Therefore, in order to analyze these concerns, the constructivist 
approach will be adopted along with the liberal intergovernmentalist account. 
Constructivism is based on the idea of ‘collective identity’, that “actors are assumed to 
belong to a community whose constitutive values and norms they share”30. The shared 
values and norms which construct a common European identity are mostly defined 
through a shared history, religion, democracy and human rights. Considering the 
shortcomings of other European integration theories to provide identity-based 
explanation, constructivism has been applied by some scholars to analyze integration. 31 
Risse, et al. base European collective identity on: 
 
a common historical heritage dating back to ancient Greece, to Christianity as a 
shared religious experience, or a community of liberal democracies and social 
market economies in the sense of a ‘Kantian pacific federation’.32 
 
                                                 
30 Schimmelfenning, Frank. “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical 
Action,and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union.” International 
Organization. 55.1 (2001): 62.  
 
31 See Risse, Thomas. “Let’s Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics.” 
International Organization. 54.1 (2000): 1-39; Sjursen, Helene. “Why Expand? The 
Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU’s Enlargement Policy.” Journal of 
Common Market Studies. 40.3 (2002): 491-513.; Neumann, I. , and Welsh, J. “The 
Other in European self-definition: an addendum to the literature on international 
society.” Review of International Studies. 17 (1991): 327-348. 
 
32 Risse, Thomas, et al. “To Euro or not to Euro? The EMU and Identity Politics in the 
European Union.” European Journal of International Relations. 5.2 (1999): 154.  
 
  16 
Risse applies the “logic of consequentialism” and the “logic of appropriateness” 
dichotomy of March and Olsen33 to define the impact of social norms and values on 
actors’ behavior. Whereas the logic of consequentialism focuses on the material 
interests to shape actor preferences and is based on the rational choice theory; the logic 
of appropriateness, on the other hand, stresses the impact of norms and identities on 
actors’ behavior. Within the rationale of the logic of appropriateness, actors’ behaviors 
are shaped by “rules that associate particular identities to particular situations”34. In the 
logic of appropriateness, it is mainly argued that actors have multiple identities and 
these identities are “invoked depending on the policy area in question”35. Identities are 
defined and redefined through social interaction.36  
 
While the European collective identity is defined through shared norms and 
values, the construction of another identity, the other, who did not possess these norms 
and values, was essential in reinforcing this definition. Neumann and Welsh argue that 
the construction of ‘the other’ played an important role in constructing ‘us’, the 
European collective identity. 37 Neumann and Welsh claim that culture is the core of 
collective identity formation in Europe and they analyze EU-Turkey relations from a 
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“logic of culture” rationale. In their analysis, “the Turks” constitute the other against 
which the European collective identity is formed.38 
 
Considering the prolonged claim of Turkey to become an EU member, and the 
exceptional course of this process, and finally the increasing levels of opposition to 
Turkey’s EU membership in some member states, the constructivist approach provides 
a reasonable explanation to analyze EU-Turkey relations. The countries which applied 
to the EU long after Turkey’s application have already been granted membership, even 
though some of them fell short of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria as well as Turkey. 
Considering the exceptional process of EU-Turkey relations, and the increasing public 
opposition against Turkey’s membership reinforces the identity-based explanations on 
this issue. For the purposes of this thesis, the constructivist theory will be applied to 
analyze the role of the collective identity and the perception of cultural threat at the 
societal level preference on Turkey’s EU membership. The second proposition of this 
study is that the German public’s perceptions of Turkey’s ‘Europeanness’ will 
determine its accession to a certain degree. This thesis will explore and test these two 
propositions from two different logics over the German position towards Turkey. 
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CHAPTER II 
The  German-Turkish Relations: A Historical Analysis 
The historical analysis of German-Turkish relations is conducive to understand 
the current dynamics in Germany towards Turkey’s EU membership. The course of 
these relations was rather stable, defined as ‘friendly’ for almost a hundred years. The 
material interests at the state level were crucial in shaping these relations in the 19th 
century through the end of the 20th century. Both countries benefited from this 
relationship in terms of economic and security interests. However, towards the end of 
the 20th century, the course of the relations underwent a considerable change. Following 
the end of the Cold War in 1989, the security interests of Germany were redefined in 
terms of its relations with Turkey. The demise of the Soviet Union led to realignment in 
Germany’s foreign policy prerogatives.39 In addition, the German Reunification in 1990 
resulted in a switch in Germany’s economic priorities.40 These developments were 
accompanied by the increasing Turkish population in the country which is a crucial 
factor shaping the public opinion towards Turkey.41 
 
The economic and security concerns in Ottoman Empire shaped its attitude 
towards Germany, whereas in the Republican Era it was mainly the economic and to 
some extent identity concerns which outlined this relationship. Even though, the 
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international developments mentioned above had also impacts on Turkey, the 
magnitude and nature of it was very different from their impact on Germany. The major 
impact of these developments was the change in the perception of the West Europe on 
Turkey’s role in the Western security system. The security concerns prevalent during 
the Cold War era had tied Turkey to the Western bloc and helped to define Turkey’s 
relations with the European Community.42 After the demise of the USSR, the attention 
shifted from Turkey to Central and Eastern European states.43 Anchoring these states to 
the EU became a priority and the candidacy of these countries was announced in the 
1997 Luxembourg Summit. Turkey’s candidacy was once again postponed. At the time, 
widening of the EU towards central and Eastern Europe was important to Germany. 
Therefore, when the accession negotiations with the CEEC started, Germany acted as a 
patron to these countries until they were granted full membership in 2004.44 However, 
Germany did not assume such a role for Turkey, and the rhetoric of the major party 
leaders and opinion makers and the increasing opposition of the public show that such a 
patronage is not likely to occur in the near future. In order to understand the change in 
Germany’s attitude towards Turkey, the relations will be analyzed in three phases. 
2.1. Ottoman Empire - German Relations in the Late 19th to Early 20th Century 
The relations between the Ottoman and Germany started in the 1880s, a time 
period when both empires were undergoing tremendous changes. Germany had been 
founded in 1871, when Bismarck succeeded in uniting the German states under an 
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empire. With the help of Bismarck, Wilhelm II assumed the throne of the newly 
founded empire. After its foundation Germany started to industrialize in a rapid rate. 
The rapid industrialization engendered the necessity to open to new markets. However, 
most of the markets had already been shared by the established colonial powers in 
Europe such as Britain and France. In this case, Germany had two policy choices, either 
to compete with Britain or France in the same markets which would very likely lead to 
conflict, or it had to find new markets. Until 1885, Bismarck was determined to pursue 
the second policy choice, and aimed at achieving a ‘Concert of Europe’ without getting 
into conflict with old powers like Britain and France. As a result, he decided to 
implement an overseas colonial policy, thus eschewing to turn to the Balkans and the 
Near East in the empire’s quest for a market.45  
 
However, Bismarck’s balance policy did not last very long, and in 1890 he was 
removed from his office by Wilhelm II. Contrary to Bismarck’s balance policy, 
Wilhelm II was determined to pursue a much more aggressive policy towards Britain 
and France. Instead of an overseas colonial policy, the empire turned to Central Europe, 
the Balkans and the Near East.46 The Near East was especially important because this 
region could provide the empire with vast sources of energy which was crucial for the 
progress of German industrialization.47 All of the above reasons increased the necessity 
for Germany to start relations with the Ottoman Empire. 
 
While Germany was occupied with finding markets and expanding its area of 
influence, the Ottoman Empire on the contrary was going through a rather problematic 
period.48 The Ottoman Empire had been defeated in a war against Russia in 1877-78 
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(93’ Harbi), and this defeat had dire consequences for the empire. The Congress of 
Berlin in 1878, following the Turkish-Russian War of 1877-1878, resulted in grave 
consequences for the Ottoman Empire, with the loss of Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Thessaly.49 More importantly, the Congress of 
Berlin was a platform where the major powers of the time, namely Russia, Britain, 
France and Austria-Hungary, made it clear that they intended to partition the Ottoman 
Empire.50 As a result of this Congress, and the attitude of these powers against itself, the 
Ottoman Empire had to realign its foreign policy.51 Faced with the threat of partition by 
these powers, the Ottoman Empire had to form a new alliance with a new partner. At 
the time, Germany was the only power which did not evidently support the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, when Germany started to build an area of influence in 
the Ottoman Empire in economic terms with an urge to find new markets, the Ottoman 
Empire was in no position to decline it.52 In addition, according to the Ottoman Empire, 
Germany was “the least threatening power among the European imperialist powers” and 
was the only “power that had not colonized Muslim territory”53. 
 
Another crucial development following the Congress of Berlin was the 
foundation of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (Düyûn-u Umumiye) in 1881. 
The Ottoman economy was on the verge of going bankrupt. With the foundation of the 
Ottoman Public Debt Administration, the control of the economy was given to Britain, 
France, German Empire, Italy, Austria-Hungary and representatives of the Ottoman 
Bank. The revenue from certain sectors was collected directly by the creditor countries, 
and the infrastructural investments were carried out by foreigners, too.54 The rapid 
                                                 
49 Zürcher, Eric Jan. Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi. Đstanbul: Đletişim Yayınları, 2005. 
p. 122.  
 
50  Ortaylı, Đlber. Osmanlı Đmparatorluğu’nda Alman 7üfuzu. p. 45. 
 
51 Ibid. p. 45. 
  
52 Ibid. p. 54. 
 
53 Zürcher, Eric Jan. Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi. p. 124. 
 
54 Ortaylı, Đlber. Osmanlı Đmparatorluğu’nda Alman 7üfuzu. p. 46. 
  22 
industrialization of Germany and its quest for new markets, and the hardships the 
Ottoman Empire was going through in terms of the external threat to its territorial unity 
and the problems in its military, economic and civil administration made the start of 
relations between two empires inevitable.  
 
The relations started with the exchange of military and civil experts between 
Germany and the Ottoman Empire. The defeat in the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War had 
revealed the urgent need for reform in the military.55 The first group of military experts 
and generals from Germany arrived at the Ottoman Empire in the 1880s, and this trend 
continued until the end of the World War I. The fact that the military service was 
compulsory in the German army and the war strategies of the army which proved to be 
successful were among the reasons why Abdülhamid II chose the German military 
officers and generals to reform the Ottoman army. In time Ottoman army officers were 
sent to Germany for training. The relations between the Ottoman Empire and Germany 
in terms of military were not constrained to the exchange of military experts. It was 
accompanied with a boost in the trade in arms between two empires. The Ottoman 
Empire’s trade with German arms factories increased steadily. In addition to the 
military, there was an urgent need for reform in the civil administration, especially in 
customs, finance and police organization. Experts in these fields were also sent from the 
German Empire.56 
 
However, the main development shaping the Ottoman-German relations was the 
construction of the Baghdad Railway. The railway was planned to start from Berlin and 
end in Baghdad. Baghdad railway was important for the Ottoman Empire in the sense 
that it would strengthen the central authority by connecting the periphery to the center, 
and it would also ease the shipment of troops very much.57 For Germany, the railway 
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was much more significant, mainly because it would connect the empire with vast 
sources of raw materials especially oil. Asia Minor and Mesopotamia would provide the 
empire with extensive agricultural resources; Mosul and Kirkuk would provide the oil 
to meet the empire’s increasing need of energy.58 The territory of Germany was not 
suitable to produce ‘strategic agricultural products’ such as cotton and wheat59, and 
Syria, Iraq and Asia Minor were rich in any type of cereals, while Mesopotamia was 
famous for its cotton production60 . 
 
In sum, the relations between Germany and the Ottoman Empire were 
determined mostly by material interests. These material interests were mainly products 
of the balance of power in the 19th century in Europe. The security concerns of the 
Ottoman Empire obliged it to seek for new partners at the international arena. Germany 
was the most expedient country to form an alliance with, since it had not colonized any 
Ottoman territory and it seemingly supported the territorial unity of the Ottoman 
Empire. Germany pursued such a policy because in order to benefit from the 
agricultural and energy resources in Asia Minor and Near East, the territorial integrity 
of the Ottoman Empire was essential.61 Becker summarizes the basic motivation of 
Germany in its relations with the Ottoman Empire as follows: 
 
…because of our geographical location and our industry’s need for new 
markets, we turn to Turkey. Every European country has a living space in the 
underdeveloped East. Britain has Egypt; France has Tunisia; Italy has Tripoli; 
Austria has Bosnia and Russia has Montenegro and indirectly Balkans. We had 
nothing. But now our living space is Turkey.62 
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After the Baghdad Railway project was launched in 1903, the German - Ottoman 
relations continued without any interruption. Even the 1908 events, the dethroning of 
Abdülhamid II and the declaration of the second constitutional monarchy, did not affect 
these relations and the Young Turks continued to promote the German influence on the 
Ottoman Empire. Eventually, when the World War I started in 1914, the elites in the 
Ottoman Empire, especially the leaders of the ruling Ittihadist government, were eager 
to enter the war on the German side. On November 11, 1914 the Ottoman Empire 
entered the war on the German side after the famous Goeben and Breslau incident. Both 
empires were defeated in the World War I and had to sign very harsh treaties.  
  
The interests of the Ottoman Empire and Germany converged on security and 
economic matters, and the definition of these interests did not change notably until the 
end of the World War I. As Wilhelm II, the German emperor, stated in a speech in 1898 
during a visit to Damascus, “Germany would be a friend to the Ottoman Sultan and the 
entire Muslim world”63, the relations between the Ottoman Empire and Germany 
continued to expand during the reign Abdülhamid II and Young Turks until 1918. The 
balance of power prevalent in the 19th century Europe was vital in expansion of 
relations between the Ottoman Empire and Germany in this period. 
2.2. The Republican Era: Turkey - Germany until late 1980s 
The end of the World War I caused a decrease in the intensity of relations 
between Germany and Turkey. After being defeated severely, both of the empires were 
forced to sign treaties with very harsh conditions. Due to the tremendous changes both 
parties went through, the relations could not be restored until the end of the World War 
II.  
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The major change on the Turkish side was the fall of the Ottoman Empire and 
the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The foundation of the Republic was a 
total departure from the Ottoman legacy in many aspects. The new state was based on 
the rule of law, it chose nationalism as a unifying force instead of multicultural or 
religious identity, and it had a secular structure.64 The primary goal of the founding 
leaders of the Republic was the recognition of Turkey as a European state and its 
admission to the Western world. In order to achieve this goal, an intense reform 
package was launched between 1923 and 1938. All of these reforms were based on 
Western ideas and systems.65 This Westernization process was different from that of the 
Ottoman Empire in that the Western ideas and systems were adopted as a whole, 
whereas in the Ottoman Empire only some aspects of the Western world were taken.66 
The European ideas were observable in nearly every aspect of the social life; in 
education, the law system, dressing codes and styles, even in music.67 The aim of 
modernization in the Western style and being recognized as a part of the European 
system started in this era and played an important role in shaping Turkey’s relations 
with Europe and defining its security and foreign policies. 
 
In the meantime, Germany also underwent historic changes. The Versailles 
Treaty laid very harsh conditions on Germany. The Treaty compelled Germany to take 
the whole responsibility for starting the war, and to pay a considerable amount of war 
reparations. In addition, the Treaty included clauses which challenged the territorial 
integrity of the empire, and strictly restricted rearmament. Having been already 
devastated by war, these clauses deteriorated the condition in Germany extensively. 
Because of the internal situation and developments in Germany between two world 
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wars, the Turkish-German relations were very limited compared to the pre-war period. 
The interwar era was a period when both Turkey and Germany redefined their security 
and economic interests, and it was obvious that these interests did not converge as much 
as they did in the pre-war era. Especially for the Turkish Republic, the security threat 
coming from the old world powers had been eliminated after World War I, which 
substantially changed its security policy. As for Germany, the defeat in World War I 
had different repercussions in that Germany had to sign the Versailles Treaty and abide 
to it. As above mentioned, the severe conditions the Treaty laid on Germany resulted in 
the formation of a rather aggressive policy towards other European powers and some 
ethnic groups within Germany, and its security and foreign policies were shaped in line 
with this aggressive policy. On the other hand, being able to decline the conditions laid 
by the Sevres Treaty as a result of the War of Independence and the foundation of the 
Republic, Turkey followed a more reserved foreign policy and contrary to Germany, 
Turkey supported the status quo.68 In addition to the divergence in the security interests 
between Germany and Turkey, their economic interests diverged as well. With the fall 
of the Ottoman Empire, the Near East, which played an important role in Germany’s 
relations with the Ottomans, was lost. Therefore, the prospects for benefiting from the 
Near East in terms of its abundant agricultural and energy resources vanished, 
eliminating one important determinant in Turkish-German relations. In short, during the 
interwar period, the interests of Germany and Turkey mostly diverged rather than 
converging. 
 
The policies followed by the national socialists resulted in some contact between 
Turkey and Germany. However this contact was very limited with the migration of 
Jewish professors and scientists in German universities to Turkey after the 1933 law 
passed due to the aryanization policy of the national socialists rearranged the 
employment law and aimed at removing the “politically untrustworthy” from the public 
offices.69 As this law was passed in Germany, the reform program was continuing 
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uninterruptedly in the Turkish Republic and these professors and scientists were 
employed in Turkish universities and contributed to the development of science in 
Turkey. They were especially influential in the foundation of vocational colleges.70 The 
literature on the relations between Turkey and Germany in the interwar period is very 
limited. The developments in Germany resulted in a decrease in the intensity of 
relations. The relations were not revived until the end of World War II. 
 
In the aftermath of World War II, Turkey eventually found the opportunity it had 
been seeking for almost three decades to become a part of Europe. The onset of the 
Cold War led to the formulation of a new identity for Europe based on security. The 
resultant bipolar system of the Cold War and the perceived threat against the expansion 
of communism in the European countries resulted in the convergence of security 
interests among most European countries and the USA. In order to counteract a possible 
Soviet aggression, NATO was formed in 1949. Within this security system, Turkey 
played a crucial role because an attack on Turkey by the USSR and its inclusion into the 
Soviet Union would be a huge threat against the Western Alliance. By entering Turkey, 
the Soviet armies could easily attack the Western alliance.71 Turkey was at the 
crossroads to balance the pressure the Soviet Union could exercise on the Western 
alliance. It was an important player in the “southern flank” of NATO to “provide a front 
line for the Western defense”72. Therefore the exclusion of Turkey from this security 
system would lead to high costs. As a result, Turkey’s relations with Europe expanded 
during the Cold War period. It was included in any organization founded to promote 
European security and integrity. Turkey became a member of NATO in 1952, was one 
of the founding members of OECC and it signed an Association Agreement with the EC 
in 1963.  
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The security interests of Turkey also converged with the security concerns of 
Europe, because the Soviet Union posed a direct threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity 
and sovereignty. The nature of relationship between Turkey and Russia which was 
based on a reciprocal non-aggression agreement prevailing since 1925 had been altered 
by the Soviet Union after 1945. The Soviet Union demanded a revision in the 1936 
Montreux Convention which would include the Soviet Union in the control of the 
straits, and claimed two Turkish cities, Kars and Ardahan. After this aggressive shift in 
Russian policy towards Turkey, the inclusion in the European security system was 
essential for Turkey.73  
 
As above mentioned, one of the primary goals of the founding leaders of the 
Turkish Republic was to be a modern European state. An immense reform package was 
implemented in line with this ideal. Therefore, in addition to the security concerns, 
Turkey’s inclusion into the European security system would make it possible to prove 
its Europeanness and become a part of the European collective identity. Until the end of 
World War II, the Turks were still perceived as the ‘other’ by the European. It was 
finally in the Cold War period when the collective European identity was re-defined on 
the basis of security concerns and within this new collective identity, Turkey would no 
longer be perceived as the ‘other’. In building this collective identity, NATO was the 
decisive factor. By acting as a uniting force throughout Europe against a common 
external enemy, NATO helped to create a ‘security community’74 and promoted a sense 
of belonging together. During the Cold War, NATO came to be a symbol of 
Europeanness. Therefore, by becoming a member to NATO and other European 
organizations, Turkey could confirm its Europeanness.  
 
The relations with Germany were also determined within the context of the 
security concerns in the Cold War. Being defeated in World War II, Germany was 
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divided into two occupational zones administered by the allied forces. In 1949, the 
division of the country was ascertained when two separate governments were formed in 
the West and East Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany represented the West 
Germany and was included in the Western bloc; whereas The German Democratic 
Republic represented East Germany and became a part of the Eastern bloc. Germany’s 
inclusion into the Western bloc was extremely important in forming a common defense 
against the Soviet Union. The USA was determined to anchor the Federal Republic of 
Germany to the Western bloc. West Germany had a quick economic recovery in the 
1950s and US incentive played an important role in it. In addition, it became a member 
of NATO, OECC and was one of the founding members of the EC. The perceived threat 
from the Soviet Union anchored the Federal Republic of Germany firmly to the Western 
bloc, since it wanted to be “under a security umbrella provided by the West”.75 During 
the Cold War period, Turkey only had relations with the Federal Republic of 
Germany.76 
 
Turkey’s relations with Germany changed in line with the Cold War dynamics. 
Turkey’s significant role in the European security system was crucial in shaping its 
relations with Germany during the Cold War. The West Germany was one of the front 
line states of the Cold War, therefore among other considerations; the role of Turkey in 
the containment of the Soviet Union and in the formation of a common defense against 
the Soviet threat was decisive in its relations with Turkey.77 Considering the crucial role 
of Turkey in the European security system, the Federal Republic of Germany was the 
main supporter of Turkey in its every attempt to become a part of Europe.78 This 
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support continued until the end of the 1989, when the end of the Cold War caused major 
changes in the security interests of Europe and in the definition of the European 
collective identity. However during the Cold War, the relations between Turkey and 
Germany were intense.79 
 
In addition to the security aspect, the Cold War and the division of Germany led 
to the tightening of the economic and social relations between these two countries. The 
German economic recovery after World War II was quick and consequently the amount 
of the labor force required by the high levels of industrialization kept increasing. 
However, having lost a large proportion of its young male population in the war, the 
Federal Republic of Germany could not meet this rising demand. The division of the 
country also contributed to the shortage in the labor force, because with the construction 
of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the West Germany was deprived of a large number of 
potential workers who were stuck in East Germany and could not pass to the West 
Germany. As a result, the Federal Republic of Germany had to rely on foreign labor 
force. Hence, it signed bilateral recruitment agreements with other countries to fill this 
gap. It was during this period when Turkey also signed a bilateral recruitment 
agreement with West Germany in October 1961, and the everlasting Turkish migration 
to Germany started, a development which was to play a decisive role in Turkish-
German relations in the future, especially in German domestic preference formation 
towards Turkey. 
 
Until the 1960s, the relations between these countries were mostly at the state-
level and did not include much social interaction between the Turkish and German 
society. Even though, in the 19th century some German military experts came to the 
Ottoman Empire and some Turkish military officers went to Germany, the number of 
these experts was limited and they had a limited area of contact. Therefore the exchange 
of military experts during this period did not result in a high level of interaction between 
the Turkish and German societies. It was similar in the Republican Era, when German 
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professors migrated to Turkey in the 1930s. Both in the 19th century and the 1930s, the 
interaction between German and Turkish groups took place mainly at the elite level, and 
the social interaction at the public level did not start until the 1960s. The actual 
interaction between these societies began with the immigration of Turkish workers and 
this immigrant Turkish population has played a crucial role in shaping the German 
social preference towards Turkey in the later periods. 
 
The systematic immigration of Turkish workers started with the conclusion of 
the bilateral recruitment agreement between Turkey and the Federal Republic of 
Germany in October 1961, and it accelerated in the very few years following the 
agreement. By the early 1970s, almost 100,000 workers annually migrated to Western 
Europe.80 The immigration continued to rise until the 1980s when it finally stabilized. 
The workers were the first group to immigrate to these countries, but soon the workers 
were followed by their spouses and children. During the 1960s and early 1970s, mainly 
the workers immigrated to the Western Europe based on the bilateral recruitment 
agreements. However, this immigration pattern changed in the mid-1970s when these 
workers were followed by their spouses and dependants. In the 1980s, the number of 
new workers immigrating to Western Europe was very limited and immigration 
occurred mostly due to reasons such as family unification. Therefore, the number of 
immigrant Turkish population in the 1980s was relatively stable.81 Today there more 
about four million Turkish immigrants in Europe, and more than two million of these 
immigrants live in Germany.82  
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Among the Western European states, the Federal Republic of Germany was the 
main state which received the highest number of Turkish people. Martin states that 
eighty percent of Turkish immigrants’ destination was the Federal Republic of Germany 
between 1968 and 1973.83 The number of Turkish immigrants increased steadily; in 
1961 there were only 9,200 Turkish people in the country, and by 1962 this figure had 
already risen to 18,000. The number of Turkish workers employed in the country 
reached 616,000 by mid-1974.84 However after the mid-1970s, the increasing number of 
Turkish immigrants in Western Europe, especially the Federal Republic of Germany 
started to cause concerns. Most of the recipient countries halted the recruitment of non-
EC immigrants, and the Federal Republic of Germany was one of them. Even though, 
recruitment of new immigrant workers was limited, the existing workers were allowed 
to stay in the host countries and keep working there and they were also allowed to 
reunify their families.85 
 
The anti-foreigner sentiments in most of these states had already been invoked, 
and even though the immigrant workers were allowed to stay in the host countries and 
reunify with their families, they encountered some difficulties in using this right. For 
example the family members who wanted to join their families under family unification 
were not granted work permits. In the early 1980s, return incentives were offered in the 
Federal Republic of Germany to facilitate the departure of immigrant workers and 
families back to their home countries. However, the range of these incentives was 
limited and they were not very effective in persuading the immigrant population to 
depart.86 Partly due to these incentives and other reasons such as retirement, some 
immigrants returned to Turkey. As for the remaining immigrants, the main policy 
followed by the German governments was the integration of the immigrant population 
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to the German society. However, in practice, the integration policy of the governments 
has not always yielded successful results. The integration problem has not been fully 
resolved yet, and practices like the prohibition of dual citizenship or the contradictory 
attitudes of political parties on the Turkish issue complicate the issue further. Finally, 
the increase in the anti-foreign sentiments among the German public adds to the 
problem.87 
 
Unlike the previous periods, the Turkish-German relations in this period had 
significant social repercussions. The immigration wave has been especially crucial in 
this respect. Before the 1960s, the relations were conducted at the state-level, and there 
was very slight or even no social involvement. In this sense, the immigration movement 
brought the German and Turkish societies together for the first time. The social 
interaction between the German society and Turkish immigrants has been decisive in 
the formation of German domestic preference on the Turkish EU bid. The German 
society’s perception of the Turkish identity has been mainly based on the immigrant 
Turkish population. This identity was not perceived as European, but as being the 
‘other’, the ‘different’. Even though, Turkey was considered to be a part of the 
European identity at the state-level which was then defined through security concerns 
prevalent in the Cold War period, at the societal level the Turkish identity was not 
acknowledged as being a part of the European collective identity. The definition of 
collective European identity varied across different levels of interaction, and whereas 
Turkey fit in one of these identity definitions, it was completely marginalized in the 
other. 
 
The perception of the Turkish population as the ‘other’, the integration problems 
which resulted both from the contradictory integration policies followed by the German 
governments and from the immigrant population, the rise in unemployment are all 
determinants, among others, that shape German society’s attitude towards the Turkish 
community. The fact that the Turkish immigrants who were expected to return to 
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Turkey eventually, remained in Germany permanently caused some resentment and 
anti-immigrant sentiments among the German society. The ‘guest workers’ had now 
turned into permanent residents; and they had no intention to leave. All of these factors 
were and still are influential in determining Turkey-Germany relations.  
 
Even though, the immigration of Turkish workers had some negative 
repercussions after the mid-1970s, it generated very fruitful results in the 1960s and 
1970s for both of the countries in economic terms. The immigrant workers were 
essential for the functioning of the German economy by filling the labor gap, and they 
were like the engine of industrial development in the country. The immigrants were 
effective in increasing the productivity, the profits and keeping down the wages. Since 
the majority of the immigrant workers were unskilled, they worked in the jobs that were 
declined by Germans. They could take longer shifts, and worked at nights and weekends 
thus fostering productivity and profitability. With regard to the Turkish economy, the 
immigration of Turkish workers proved beneficial in two ways. First of all, the German 
labor market acted as a vacuum for the surplus in the Turkish labor market. Annually, 
around one-third of the unemployed labor force migrated to Western Europe, which 
relieved the burden on the Turkish labor market. Secondly, the remittances brought to 
Turkey by the immigrant workers supplied the foreign currency to buy raw materials 
and machinery for the Turkish industry.88  
 
In sum, during this period the security and economic concerns prevalent in the 
Western world determined Turkey-German relations at the state-level on one hand, and 
on the other hand the societal factors came into play for the first time.  
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2.3. A ew Turn in Turkish-German Relations with Turkey’s EU Bid 
The Turkish-German relations took a completely different turn at the end of the 
1980s. Until then the relations between these two countries could be considered as 
‘friendly’. Although there was dissatisfaction at the societal level, the security concerns 
were preponderant over the societal concerns, and the relations were not affected by the 
dissatisfaction at the societal level. Germany supported Turkey in its every attempt to 
become a part of the European system. It was one of the ardent supporters when Turkey 
applied to the EC in 1959. However, its attitude towards Turkey, especially on Turkey’s 
EU bid, has changed to a great extent since the end of the 1980s. Both domestic factors 
and international developments played a role in the shift in Turkish-German relations in 
this period; the end of the Cold War, German Unification and the increasing domestic 
opposition to Turkey’s EU membership. 
 
During the Cold War, Turkey’s inclusion into the European security system was 
essential. Turkey’s strategic location and its role in the ‘southern flank’ of NATO 
determined the country’s relations with Western Europe.89 At the time, along with the 
other Western European states, the security interests and foreign policy formation of the 
Federal Republic of Germany were shaped by the security concerns prevalent during the 
Cold War.90 However, with the end of the Cold War, the common security threat which 
united the Western Europe vanished. Consequently, the security and foreign policies of 
European states were redefined. Turkey-German relations were affected by end of the 
Cold War in that Germany’s foreign policy priorities were also redefined and Turkey 
lost its strategic importance for Germany considerably.91 
 
The collapse of the bipolar system and the removal of the Soviet threat relieved 
all of the Western European states, but the impact of these developments was more 
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substantial on Germany in two ways. With the demise of the Soviet Union, a power 
vacuum emerged in the Central and Eastern Europe. This region was considered to be 
the German hinterland92 and was essential for Germany’s security. In order to promote 
the stability in the region and deter any development that can pose a threat to its 
security, Germany took immediate measure to fill this power vacuum which emerged 
with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and to tie the Central and Eastern Europe to the 
West. The former foreign minister of Germany, Joschka Fischer, stated that the 
exclusion of Central Eastern Europe from the EU would increase the possibility of 
conflicts in the region making “Europe a continent of uncertainty” and in such a case, 
“Germany in particular would be the big loser.”93 Consequently, after the 1990, the 
German security and foreign policy was redefined in line with this goal.  
 
In addition to the security concerns regarding this region, Germany’s attitude 
towards the Central and Eastern Europe was influenced by the perceived economic 
benefits the region would provide. The growing economy of Germany once again 
forced the country to find new markets. In this sense, the Central and Eastern Europe 
would provide markets for Germany.94 Due to these concerns, Germany prioritized the 
relations with Central and Eastern European countries, and took initiatives to include 
them to the EU. Especially during Germany’s Council presidency in 1994, the eastern 
enlargement was one of the main topics in its agenda, and several steps were taken to 
accelerate their accession to the EU like the ‘security dialogue’ which was envisaged to 
provide guidance to the CEEC in this process.95 Germany’s support was prominent 
during their application, negotiation and accession to the Union. As a result of these 
developments, the relations with Turkey lost their priority. The support Germany gave 
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to Turkey in the Cold War era was channeled to the Central Eastern European countries. 
The 1997 Luxembourg Summit was a clear demonstration of the change in Germany’s 
attitude towards Turkey. It was declared in the summit that ten Central Eastern 
European countries, with Malta and Cyprus, were granted candidacy to the EU. Turkey 
was not included in the list of candidates.  
 
The security and economic concerns regarding the Central and Eastern Europe, 
however, was not the only reason of the change in German position. The repercussions 
of the German Reunification in 1990 also had a considerable impact on Germany’s 
attitude towards Turkey in this period.96 The integration of the East Germans generated 
problems. The increase in unemployment was one of the problems in the aftermath of 
unification. The inclusion of an additional labor force created pressure on the labor 
market. The socio-cultural integration of East Germans was another concern. After 
having lived in a completely different social and economic setting, the East Germans 
had difficulties in integrating to West Germany. In order to promote the integration of 
these people, the German identity was emphasized, since it would provide a common 
bond that would keep these two distinct groups together.97 This identity was defined on 
ethnic lines.98 
 
The rise in unemployment and the emphasis on the German identity triggered an 
increase in the anti-immigrant sentiments in Germany that had already been prevalent 
since the mid-1970s.99 Even though it had been almost thirty years since the first group 
of Turkish immigrants arrived in Germany, they were still not accepted as a part of the 
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German society.100 The identity-based approach to promote the integration of East 
Germans emphasized the ‘otherness’ of the Turkish immigrants more. The anti-
immigrant sentiments reached such a level that at some point they turned into violent 
actions. The Solingen incident in 1993 is a prominent example of it. The ‘otherness’ of 
the Turkish population was not only stressed by the public, but the anti-immigrant 
statements were used increasingly in the rhetoric of the political parties. 
 
In Germany, anti-immigrant sentiments are the main determinant in domestic 
opposition towards Turkey, because some domestic groups are very much concerned of 
another wave of immigration.101 This concern can also be observed in the rhetoric of 
some political party leaders and opinion makers. In this respect, CDU/ CSU are the 
major political parties with a considerable opposition to Turkey’s EU accession based 
on identity concerns. The CDU/CSU was the governing party in Germany when the 
1997 Luxembourg Summit decision not to involve Turkey in the enlargement process 
was taken. It can be argued that Germany’s opposition to grant Turkey the candidate 
status in that round was determined by the concerns of the governing party.102  
 
The 1998 German elections, however, engendered a shift in Germany’s position 
towards Turkey. The CDU/CSU government was replaced by the coalition government 
of SPD and the Greens. Contrary to CDU/CSU, the red-green coalition supported 
Turkey’s EU bid. In 1999 Helsinki Summit, Turkey was finally granted the candidate 
status, and the red-green coalition that was in power at the time. However, in the 
following elections, SPD and the Greens lost ground to CDU/CSU and FDP. The 
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German attitude towards Turkey altered with changes in the governing party after the 
late 1980s.103  
 
The societal concerns, however, are not the sole determinants in Germany’s 
attitude towards Turkey after the 1990s. In terms of security and economic interests, 
Turkey is still an important partner. Even though, the role of Turkey was uncertain for a 
short period of time with the end of the Cold War, the later developments both in 
Europe and in the other parts of the world reassured the substantial role Turkey could 
play in the European security system. The post-Cold War system, indeed, defined a 
more multilateral role for Turkey. The regional conflicts which arose in Bosnia and 
Kosovo, and the 9/11 attacks led to realignment in the security and foreign policy of the 
EU. Promoting security and stability in the region became one of the primary goals of 
the new foreign and security policy of the EU. In this respect, Turkey became an 
important asset once more with its “geostrategic location, its military capabilities and its 
membership in NATO, and its role as a mediator between the Eastern and Western 
cultures”104.  
 
During the Cold War period, the EU was much of a regional actor whose 
influence area was basically limited to Europe. It was not endowed with a role in 
providing security and defense in the area. In this sense, it was mainly dependent on 
NATO and the USA. Even though there were some attempts to attribute such a role to 
the EU such as the creation of WEU, these attempts were mostly unsuccessful. 
However, with the demise of the bipolar system, the EU started to embark a different 
role in the international arena, and began to emerge as an international actor, with “traits 
of an embryonic military actor”105. It started to develop a separate security and defense 
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identity than NATO. The revitalization of WEU, the formation of the CFSP pillar in the 
Maastricht Treaty, the decision to launch the Rapid Reaction Force and the Battle 
Groups were all attempts to realize this aim. In this sense, the military capabilities of 
Turkey with very large standing army and modern war technology became an important 
asset for the EU at this point to enhance its hard power capacities. Additionally, 
Turkey’s NATO membership was perceived as another asset for the EU security and 
defense policy, especially with the 1999 Helsinki Summit decision when the EU 
claimed automatic access to NATO assets. The EU was granted the right to access 
NATO assets with the 2002 Istanbul Document, which also gave Turkey the full rights 
for voting and participation in the EU operations in which the NATO assets were used 
and in operations concerning the security of Turkey. Even if the NATO assets are not 
deployed, Turkey would be asked in. Thus Turkey got the opportunity to “provide input 
to ESDP”106, and its role in EU’s new security and defense structure was strengthened.  
 
In addition to the benefits Turkey would provide with its military capacities and 
NATO membership, the geostrategic location of Turkey has been another significant 
determinant in EU-Turkey relations, especially in terms of energy security. The 
geostrategic location of Turkey makes it neighbors with the Black Sea region, the 
Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. Its relations with the Black 
Sea region through the Black Sea Economic Co-Operation Project and the Caucasus and 
Central Asian countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union play an important role in 
the region. The role of Turkey in these regions is especially important for the EU 
because the energy supply of the Union is provided from these regions and Turkey 
stands at a crossroads where most of the energy pipelines emerging from these regions 
reach to Europe. Thus Turkey’s role in the energy supply security of the Union is 
crucial. “EU imports approximately 60 percent of its energy needs from Turkey’s 
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neighboring regions and attaches utmost importance to secured access to these 
resources.”107 
 
The 9/11 attacks emphasized another role Turkey could play in the EU security 
and defense system. The attacks showed that Turkey’s role as a mediator between 
Eastern and Western cultures would be essential for the EU if it wanted to promote 
security and stability, and to prevent the diffusion of Islamic fundamentalism in the 
neighboring regions. All of these factors impacted the EU-Turkey relations in general. 
Germany’s security interests cannot be considered separately from those of the EU. 
Therefore, the Turkish-German relations were influenced by emerging role Turkey 
could play in the post-Cold War system. From this perspective, the inclusion of Turkey 
into the EU was perceived as beneficial at the state-level. However, the opposition to 
Turkey’s EU bid at the domestic level kept growing in this period, creating a division 
between the state-level and domestic level preferences.  
 
Conclusion:  
 
To sum, the current dynamics that shape the social preference formation cannot be 
explained without the historical analysis of Turkish-German relations. The historical 
analysis shows that the convergence of security and economic interests between 
Germany and Turkey was the main driving force in German-Turkish relations for a very 
long time. During the late 19th and early 20th century, the abundant agricultural and 
energy resources in Asia Minor and Near East were the main motivation for Germany to 
start relations with the Ottoman Empire. As for the Ottoman Empire, the perceived 
external threat against its territorial integrity was the main determinant in its relations 
with the German Empire. The relations which started with the exchange of experts in 
military and civil administration in the 1880s got closer as in the early 20th century and 
evolved into an alliance in World War I. After the war, due to internal changes both 
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countries were going through, there was a halt in the relations in the interwar period. 
However, with the onset of the Cold War, the security concerns united these two 
countries on a common ground again. The NATO partnership was especially significant 
in strengthening the relations between Turkey and Germany. Similar to the previous 
phase, the German-Turkish relations were determined by the convergence of security 
and economic concerns in this period. In this sense, the trajectory of the Turkish-
German relations was relatively straightforward until the 1980s. The relations between 
Germany and Turkey can be analyzed using a rational intergovernmentalist approach 
until the 1980s. However, the influence of the domestic groups on German-Turkish 
relations increased after the 1980s, particularly in terms of opposition to Turkey’s EU 
membership. The presence of guest workers contributed to the change in German view 
towards Turkey considerably, especially at the societal level. In addition, the changing 
needs of Germany redefined the Turkish-German relations. 
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CHAPTER III 
Major Political Parties in Germany and their Stance towards Turkey’s Accession 
This chapter examines the stance of the major political parties towards the 
‘Turkish issue’ and their relative impact on the overall preference formation. In this 
view, the stances of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the Christian 
Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), the 
Greens and the Free Democratic Party (FPD) will be examined in detail.  
 
State-level explanations fall short of explaining the major turns in Germany’s 
attitude towards Turkey’s EU bid. The change in Germany’s preferences towards 
Turkey between 1997 Luxembourg Summit, when Turkey was excluded from the 
enlargement list, and 1999 Helsinki Summit, when it was finally granted the candidacy 
status is a prominent example of it. Germany overtly supported both decisions. Since 
these decisions were so different, German position could be seen as contradictory. 
Within these two years, there was no major shift in Germany’s security or foreign 
policy which could have engendered such a change. The repercussions of the end of the 
Cold War and German Reunification had been left far behind. There was no major 
development that led to realignment in German foreign and security policy. Turkey’s 
role in the European security and economic structure had been stable for some time. The 
regional conflicts in the Balkans proved that Turkey would be indispensable the 
European security system. In addition, the conclusion of the Customs Union agreement 
in 1995 was important in reinforcing Turkey’s role in the EU in economic terms. 
Therefore none of these developments are sufficient to explain the change in German 
attitude between 1997 and 1999.  
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The change in Germany’s position towards Turkey is not confined with the 1999 
Helsinki Summit. The relation between these two countries in terms of Turkey’s EU bid 
is characterized by ups and downs. As explained in the second chapter, Germany’s 
attitude towards Turkey was rather supportive during the Cold War years and it backed 
Turkey’s application to the EC in 1959. This supportive attitude continued until the 
second half of the 1980s and Germany’s support for Turkey was replaced by its 
antagonism, and when Turkey applied to EC in 1987, it could no longer rely on 
Germany. The antagonism which prevailed until 1998 was once again replaced by a 
supportive attitude and this change had a profound impact on Turkey’s EU bid with 
1999 Helsinki Summit decision and 2002 Copenhagen Summit when it decided to start 
accession negotiations with Turkey after an evaluation of 2004 Progress Report. Yet 
this positive atmosphere in German-Turkish relations in terms of Turkey’s EU 
membership was to alter once again after 2005. The state-level explanations which 
provided a more or less thorough picture of Turkish-German relations have become 
insufficient since the second half of the 1980s. Consequently, it is necessary to turn to 
domestic developments that took place in Germany after the late 1980s. The analysis of 
the societal level preference formation will provide a more thorough explanation for the 
shifts in Germany’s attitude towards Turkey’s EU bid. 
 
The societal level preference formation will be analyzed in light of Moravcsik’s 
liberal intergovernmentalist account and Putnam’s two-level game approach. As 
explained in further detail in the first chapter, the state preferences are defined 
domestically. There are various societal groups with divergent interests which compete 
with each other trying to influence the preference formation. The “identity of these 
societal groups, the nature of their interests and their relative influence on domestic 
policy” are the main determinants of foreign policy formation.108 The fact that the 
interests are defined at level I by certain societal groups constrains the governments at 
the international bargaining table. Since the governments have to depend on “the 
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support of a coalition of domestic voters, parties, interest groups and bureaucracies”109 
to stay in power, they have to satisfy the interests of influential domestic groups in 
interstate bargaining. Putnam identifies the domestic groups as parties, social classes, 
interest groups (both economic and non-economic), legislators, and the public.110 In 
analyzing the social preference formation in Germany, only the political parties and the 
public will be examined. Even though it is beyond doubt that the other domestic groups 
have considerable impact on the social preference formation, the available data in the 
field is insufficient to assess such impact. On the other hand, the impact of the political 
parties and the public can be relatively estimated by looking at the party programs and 
the statements made by the party leaders and major opinion makers on the issue and by 
analyzing the public opinion polls.  
 
There is a clear rift among the major political parties on the Turkish issue. The 
SPD and Greens overtly support the accession of Turkey to the EU. The CDU/CSU 
fiercely opposes Turkey’s full-membership, and the FDP seems quite uncertain on its 
position. While it doesn’t oppose Turkey’s full-membership as much as CDU/CSU, it 
does not support Turkey’s EU bid as openly as SPD and the Greens. Similar to FDP, 
The Leftist Party is uncertain on its stance towards the Turkish issue. It does not oppose 
a Turkish membership completely, but argues that Turkey has to implement more 
reforms to improve its human rights record and the minority rights especially as regards 
to the Kurdish population.111 However, the position of the Leftist Party on the Turkish 
issue is not as evident and influential as SPD, CDU/CSU, the Greens and the FDP. 
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The support or the opposition of these political parties is influenced by various 
determinants. The economic and security concerns shape the attitude of those parties 
which support Turkey’s membership, whereas the identity concerns seem to influence 
the stance of CDU/CSU. In addition to economic, security and identity based concerns, 
the vote concerns of the political parties affect their attitude on the Turkish issue. 
Turkey’s EU membership has become a highly politicized issue in Germany which 
influences the vote choice of the citizens. Since Turkey’s EU membership is supposed 
to have tangible consequences on the ordinary citizens, like in the case of immigration, 
the citizens are inclined to vote for the parties in line with their own preferences on the 
Turkish issue. The citizens who support Turkey’s entry to the EU are most likely to vote 
for SPD and the Greens, while the ones who oppose such a development would vote for 
CDU/CSU or FDP.112 Consequently, the vote choice of the citizens influences the 
attitude of the political parties to some extent, since they “require the support of the 
domestic voters” to stay in power or to assume the power.113 
 
The national preference formation towards Turkey is significantly influenced by 
this division among the political parties on this issue. The major shifts in Germany’s 
attitude towards Turkey mostly coincide with the changes in the governing party. When 
the CDU/CSU is in power, the support of the German government to Turkey’s EU 
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membership diminishes. The Kohl government and 1997 Luxembourg Summit decision 
is a clear illustration of this. When the SPD and the Greens make up the government, on 
the other hand, evidently this trend is reversed, and the support for Turkey increases 
tremendously. The Schröder government and the 1999 Helsinki Summit decision 
demonstrate this fact clearly. The ‘relative influence’ of these parties on the preference 
formation is outstanding, concerning the fact that either SPD or CDU is the governing 
party or in a coalition government in which the Greens or the FDP is the coalition 
partner. This fact increases the relative influence of these parties in preference 
formation at the domestic level. 
3.1. The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD): 
SPD has been an ardent supporter of Turkey’s EU membership. Consequently, it 
has been repeatedly stated by the party leaders and important opinion makers that 
Turkey had to be anchored to the EU with full-membership. The turning point for this 
came with the 1998 national elections in Germany. After assuming power in 1998, the 
Schröder government initiated several attempts to bring Turkey closer to the EU. In this 
sense, the period 1998-2005 was very fruitful in Turkey’s EU bid, since the SPD took 
over the government from CDU/CSU and FDP coalition and formed a coalition with the 
Greens. After seizing the power, the relations between Germany and Turkey were 
recovered quickly, and contrary to the Kohl government, Germany became the 
‘historical ally’ of Turkey in European matters once again. Critical developments which 
altered the course of EU-Turkey relations, such as the decision to grant Turkey the 
candidate status, and start accession negotiations, were taken during the rule of the Red-
Green coalition. The Schröder government’s support was unrelenting in all of these 
developments. The Red-Green government showed its determination to depart from the 
Kohl government’s Turkey with its attempts to compensate for the 1997 Luxembourg 
Summit decision by drafting a proposal for Turkey during its Council presidency. The 
proposal was presented at the Cologne Summit 1999, yet it was rejected.114 But still it 
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was an important attempt on the side of the Schröder government to show its good 
intentions on this issue.  
 
The potential economic and security benefits of Turkey’s inclusion to the EU 
were influential in determining the coalition government’s attitude towards Turkey 
which was openly stated by Schröder and Fischer. Fischer emphasized the strategic role 
Turkey has played in the European security system for 50 years, and argued that given 
the increase in the regional conflicts requires a redefinition of this role.115 He states that 
“Turkey no longer lies in the periphery in strategic terms … [but] is located at the 
crossroads between three crisis-prone regions: the Balkans, the Southern Caucasus and 
the Middle East and at the crossroads of important energy, transportation and 
communication networks”,116 and even claims that Turkey is now “in the center of [EU] 
security”117. Schröder backed Fischer by asserting that the government’s supportive 
attitude towards Turkey was to some extent motivated by “regional circumstances”, and 
“the unstable Middle East and Asia” adds to Turkey’s “unique situation in the region as 
regards Europe’s interests.”118 The 9/11 attacks further reinforced the strategic 
importance of Turkey in terms of stability and security in the region. Turkey’s role as a 
mediator between the Western and Eastern cultures has become vital. It has been 
stressed by Schröder and Fischer that Turkey plays a vital role in the region as a “bridge 
to other Islamic states”119.  In this view, the security benefits of Turkey’s inclusion were 
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considered essential for the EU and the security concerns were at the heart of SPD’s and 
the coalition government’s support to Turkey. On the other hand, the costs of its 
exclusion were perceived to be very high by the Schröder government. The foreign 
minister Fischer once stated that “the EU might shut the doors on Turkey; however this 
could come at a tremendous cost”120. As a result, Turkey’s full membership to the EU 
was always in the agenda of the Schröder government. 
 
The economic benefits seem to be another motive for the SPD support. Turkey is 
an important trade partner of the EU, and Germany is the main economic and 
commercial partner of Turkey in the EU with high amounts of bilateral trade and high 
levels of German investment in Turkey. The accession of Turkey to the EU is expected 
to bring about a boost in the foreign direct investment in Turkey “because of the 
implementation of the EU standards and the further consolidation of Turkey’s political 
and economic stability.”121 The economic, political and legislative reforms which 
Turkey would be compelled to implement in the EU accession process are supposed to 
create a more credible environment for foreign direct investment. In addition to being a 
more credible and stable market for the EU, Turkey would “function as a gateway to 
countries in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the entire Middle East region”122 thus 
providing other markets for German investment.  
 
The SPD position towards Turkey is also shaped by Turkey’s democratic 
credentials. Therefore, the intense reform package Turkey has launched to comply with 
the Copenhagen criteria constitutes another motive for the support of the SPD and the 
Schröder government. The reforms implemented by Turkey are welcomed by both the 
EU and Germany. It is assumed that these reforms have “strengthened Turkey’s 
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democracy and the rule of law”123 in the country. In this sense, Turkey is expected to 
form an example for the other countries in the region as a country of Muslim majority 
with a full-fledged democracy and rule of law, a good human rights record and a 
country which respects minority rights. Turkey would act as a dispenser of European 
values. The “globalization of fundamental values” has been considered to be vital in 
eliminating a “religious and cultural clash of civilizations between the Islamic Arab 
world and the West”124 in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The role of Turkey as a 
dispenser of European values has been emphasized repeatedly by Schröder, Fischer and 
in party manifests and programs.125 Schröder encouraged the AKP government to 
continue with the reform process in a visit to Ankara. 
 
In addition to the security and economic concerns, the Turkish population in 
Germany is another crucial factor influencing SPD’s pro-Turkish attitude. There are 
around 500,000 voters of Turkish origin in Germany today. Many of these people 
became German citizens thanks to the attempts of the Schröder government. Social 
Democrats argued that the inclusion of Turkey in the EU would help to solve the 
problems related to immigration and minority rights.126 When the Schröder government 
assumed power, the decisions regarding the Turkish immigrants were shaped by this 
policy of the SPD. The government took several steps to ameliorate the integration and 
naturalization of the immigrants. There are more than 2 million Turks in Germany, and 
nearly 700,000 of them have become German citizens. The integration and 
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naturalization of the Turkish community have been on the agenda of German 
governments since the 1970s when it was realized that the Gastarbeiter had become 
permanent residents. However, until the late 1990s, most governments failed to take 
satisfactory steps that would expedite the integration. The problem of integration and 
naturalization of the Turkish population was not dealt with effective means, and the 
legal status of the immigrants was defined by the 1965 Foreigners’ Act 
(Ausländergesetz) which was very limited in its scope because it was originally 
designed to regulate the work and residence permit of the guest workers.127 The Act 
became very insufficient as the number of Turkish workers who decided to settle in 
Germany permanently increased and in the 1990s it was completely futile in regulating 
the legal status of more than 1,5 million Turkish people living in Germany. The 
Foreigners’ Act was not revised until 1990. The German governments and the society 
refused to accept the fact that the guest workers had actually become permanent 
residents. Until 1990s the prevalent idea was that: 
 
The Federal Republic of Germany is not a country of immigration; it does not 
strive to increase the number of German citizens by way of naturalization […] 
the granting of German citizenship can only be considered if a public interest in 
the naturalization exists […] the personal desires and economic interests of the 
applicant cannot be decisive.128 
 
Thus the Turkish immigrants, some of whom had been living in Germany for 
more than thirty years, remained as ‘foreigners’. They were not perceived as a part of 
German society. Even though the governments made some attempts to expedite 
integration at the societal level, since these attempts were not complemented with 
amendments in the legal status of immigrants, they were not very effectual. Full 
integration still required a redefinition of nationality which would grant the immigrants 
the right to obtain citizenship. The nationality was defined on ethno-cultural lines and 
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the principle of jus sanguini constituted the basis of citizenship.129 Even though, there 
were some revisions to the 1965 Foreigners’ Act in 1990 and 1993, the requirements for 
the naturalization of immigrants were still very harsh. According to the 1990 
Foreigners’ Law, the immigrants between 16 and 23 years of age were required to have 
resided in Germany for eight or more years, and foreigners above 23 were asked to have 
lived in Germany at least 15 years.130 It was the 1999 new German Nationality Act 
which introduced the jus soli principle to the definition of nationality and citizenship.131 
The new law gave the children born in Germany the right to obtain German citizenship, 
and enabled them to retain dual citizenship until the age of 23.132 Another amendment 
was the shortening of the time period the foreigners had to spend in Germany before 
acquiring citizenship. With the new Law, foreigners were required to have eight years 
of habitual residence to obtain citizenship as opposed to the fifteen years that the 
previous acts required.133 By introducing this Law, Germany took an important step to 
fully integrate the immigrant population to German society. 
 
The role of the SPD was crucial in these developments. The new Citizenship 
Law was introduced by the Schröder government in its first year of rule. The attempts to 
give “birthright citizenship” to foreigners had already started before 1999. The SPD had 
submitted four proposals to reform the nationality law in 1885, 1988, 1989 and 1993.134 
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The expedition of integration of immigrant population to German society has long been 
on the agenda of SPD and it is emphasized both in the rhetoric of the party leaders and 
in the party programs. It is underlined in the party programs that “Germany is a country 
of immigration” which is considered to have “enriched [the] country in business and 
culture”. It is argued that the integration of the immigrants to society can be realized by 
“giving [the immigrants] all opportunities to take part in the life of [the] society.”135 The 
1999 new Citizenship Law was a vital step to achieve this goal. The Citizenship Law 
also effected the Turkish-German relations, showing once again the positive attitude of 
SPD towards Turkey, and also helped to increase the prestige of SPD among the 
Turkish population in Germany. It is estimated that there are approximately 700,000 
Turkish immigrants who became German citizens. The Citizenship Law was influential 
in the increase in the number of Turkish people who took German citizenship.136 This 
number is expected to increase further if dual citizenship is allowed. According to the 
current Citizenship Law, the immigrants cannot retain dual citizenship, and have to 
choose between German or Turkish citizenship. The right to dual citizenship was 
included in the proposal of Schröder government in 1999; however it was rejected due 
to the opposition of CDU/CSU. As well as the security and economic concerns, and the 
party’s commitment to expedite the integration of immigrants to the German society, 
the increasing number of German voters of Turkish origin is considered to be influential 
in shaping the attitude of SPD towards Turkey. For instance, Kohl criticized Schröder’s 
pro-Turkish attitude by claiming that Schröder “wants more than anything to win votes, 
and hopes his support for Turkey will win him the sympathy of the Turkish voters.”137  
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The red-green coalition was defeated in 2005 federal elections and was replaced 
by CDU/CSU and SPD coalition. After this defeat Schröder announced his resignation. 
During his term in office and after his resignation, Schröder assured the Turkish 
government many times that Germany would back Turkey’s EU bid. Before the 
negotiation talks started on 3 October 2005, in an interview with a Turkish journalist, he 
reassured that the EU would keep its promise in terms of Turkey’s EU bid by saying 
that “Turkey has fulfilled all its promises, now it is time we honor ours.”138 Schröder 
continued to support Turkey even after he left office in 2005. Just before he left, he 
declared that the German foreign policy on the Turkish issue would not alter during the 
rule of the new government, and that the privileged partnership would not be considered 
as an alternative option since the full accession talks had already started.139 SPD 
supported the full-membership of Turkey to the EU. Schröder and other opinion makers 
in the SPD have so far criticized the ‘privileged partnership’ option proposed by the 
CDU leader Angela Merkel. Schröder argued that “privileged partnership alternative 
could neither meet the current developments nor the promises given to Turkey.”140In 
short, between 1998 and 2005 the Schröder government was very supportive of 
Turkey’s EU membership and took tangible steps to ameliorate the Turkey-EU relations 
such as the 1999 Cologne Summit proposal. Schröder was a prominent figure in this 
process; he acted like a “patron for Turkey”141 during this period.  
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The pro-Turkish policy of SPD, however, did not change after Schröder 
resigned.142 The party’s support for Turkish membership was reassured in the rhetoric 
of the party members. In 2006, Kurt Beck, the SPD party leader of the time, warned that 
“closing the door to Turkish membership” would be “a capital mistake” and added that 
an alternative to full-membership would not be “an adequate offer”.143 Similar to Beck, 
Steinmeier who became the foreign minister of the grand coalition government also 
expressed support for Turkey. In line with the overall SPD policy, he stated that the 
reform packages which have been implemented to conform to the criteria should be 
supported, and added that with these reforms “Turkey will show that democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law can be realized in a predominantly Muslim country.”144 He 
also emphasized the importance of Turkey’s “integration with the EU for the integration 
of the Turkish community in Germany”145. The pro-Turkish stance of the foreign 
minister was influential in tempering the German attitude towards Turkey during the 
grand coalition. The SPD support for Turkey which was much evident during the red-
green coalition continued after the 2005 elections and it is still prevalent.  
 
In sum, the SPD support has been based on the prospective material benefits of 
Turkey’s inclusion into the EU in terms of security and economics. According to SPD, 
Turkey is highly important for the European security with its military capacities, NATO 
membership, geostrategic location and mediator role. These determinants shape SPD 
preferences from the security perspective. Turkey is already an important trade partner 
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of Germany. But if it becomes a full member to the EU, the Turkish market will be 
attract more foreign direct investment, because the reforms which are to be 
implemented in the accession process will make the Turkish market more stable and 
credible. In addition, Turkey will help the EU to open to new markets in other regions 
such as Caucasia, Central Asia and the Middle East. These potential economic benefits 
also determine the pro-Turkish stance of SPD. Another determinant shaping the stance 
of SPD is the Turkey’s democratic credentials. According to SPD, the reform package 
which Turkey has to implement in order to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria will 
increase its democratic credentials. The increase in democratic credentials of Turkey is 
important, because it can set an example to other countries with predominantly Muslim 
populations. 
3.2. Christian Democratic Union of Germany / Bavarian Christian Social Union: 
Contrary to the supportive attitude of SPD for Turkey’s full-membership to the 
EU, CDU/CSU has been the source of uncompromising opposition to Turkey’s EU bid. 
The party leaders and opinion makers have often stated that Turkey’s inclusion to the 
EU with full-membership would be a liability rather than an asset. Instead of full-
membership, a special partnership which would still anchor Turkey to the EU without 
endowing it with the same rights granted to other member states is considered to be a 
more viable option among the CDU/CSU circles. Thus Turkey would be neither 
completely included to the EU system nor fully excluded. In opposition to SPD, whose 
support for Turkey mainly derived from security and economic concerns; the opposition 
of CDU/CSU is essentially based on cultural differences between Turkey and the EU 
countries. Thus, while basically utility-driven concerns define the attitude of Social 
Democrats towards Turkey, the identity-based concerns are influential in shaping the 
policy of CDU/CSU on the Turkish issue. In this sense, liberal intergovernmentalist 
account of Moravcsik which provides reasonable explanations for the preference 
formation on the SPD side falls short of explaining the CDU/CSU opposition. The 
constructivist approach provides more exhaustive explanations in analyzing the reasons 
of opposition on the German center-right.  
 
  57 
According to the constructivist approach, a collective European identity is one of 
the driving forces of the European integration which cannot be merely explained 
through the convergence of material interests. “Actors are assumed to belong to a 
community whose values and norms they share”146 and in the EU case, the collective 
European identity is defined through “a common historical heritage dating back to 
ancient Greece, to Christianity as a shared religious experience, or a community of 
liberal democracies and social market economies”147. Other communities who do not 
share these values and norms are considered as “the other”.148  
 
The CDU/CSU attitude towards Turkey’s EU accession is very much in 
conformity with this line of thought. The fact that Turkey does not share the collective 
culture, common history and religious experience of the other member states shapes the 
CDU/CSU policy on the Turkish issue which is often reiterated by the party leaders and 
major opinion makers. Turkish culture was regarded as utterly different from the 
European collective identity, and this perception was evident in the decisions taken as 
regards to Turkey’s EU aspirations. It was during the Kohl government in the 1990s 
when the attitude of the CDU was expressed clearly for the first time when the Kohl 
government opposed to the inclusion of Turkey in the next enlargement round in 1997 
Luxembourg Summit. The position of the Kohl government in this summit caused 
tension between Turkey and Germany, and the Turkish prime minister of the time, 
Mesut Yılmaz, accused the EU for “discriminating against Turkey for religious reasons” 
and claimed that “the German Chancellor in particular was determined to turn the EU 
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into a Christian club.”149 Schröder had also criticized Kohl for creating an “impression 
that Turkey, with a largely Muslim population, is left on the outside because of borders 
of faith”.150  
 
The identity based concerns played an important role in shaping the attitude of 
successive CDU/CSU leaders and opinion makers. Both Merkel and Stoiber expressed 
several times that Turkey did not fit in the European collective identity because it was 
culturally too different. “The common historical heritage and common values on the 
basis of Christianity and humanism”151 constituted the European identity according to 
Stoiber, the former chairman of the CSU, who several months later added that “Europe 
is a community of values, [...] if we want to make the European Union an intellectual 
center, then I say Turkey has no place here.”152 This attitude of CDU/CSU was also 
reflected on the decisions related to the Turkish community in Germany. The 
CDU/CSU did not share the pro-immigrant approach of the SPD and the Greens, and 
when the Schröder government initiated the revision of the citizenship law, the 
CDU/CSU rejected fiercely the proposal for dual citizenship.153 Instead, the CDU/CSU 
adopted an anti-immigrant stance. The former party leader Kohl even stated that 
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“Germany is not a country of immigration”154. Due to this clear anti-immigrant rhetoric 
and the Christian identity of the parties, the Turkish population does not influence the 
stance of the CDU/CSU as much as it affects the attitude of SPD and the Greens. As 
stated above, the Turkish voters might be one of the factors that influence the supportive 
attitude of the SPD and the Greens. However, obviously gaining the support of the 
Turkish voters is not a concern for CDU/CSU. It can be argued that these parties target 
to gain the votes of a different electoral body with their Christian identity and anti-
immigrant approach. Therefore, the Turkish voters do not concern CDU/CSU.  
 
The opposition of CDU/CSU was rigid during the red-green coalition from 1998 
to 2005, and Merkel and Stoiber criticized the pro-Turkish attitude of the Schröder 
government. It has been disclosed that Merkel and Stoiber sent a letter to Schröder and 
other EU leaders to convince them for offering Turkey a privileged partnership instead 
of full-membership before an informal meeting of EU foreign ministers where the 
opening of accession negotiations were going to be discussed. It was stated in the letter 
that “accepting Turkey would overburden the EU politically, economically and socially 
and would endanger the European integration process.”155 Because of these reasons, 
along with the “continuous refusal of Turkey to recognize the Republic of Cyprus” and 
its “still-significant problems in upholding and imposing human rights”, Merkel and 
Stoiber demanded that the negotiation framework would also include “the perspective 
of a privileged partnership with Turkey.”156 
 
Ever since the introduction of the idea by Merkel in 2004, the privileged 
partnership is perceived as the only way that Turkey could be included in the EU among 
the CDU/CSU. The concept of privileged partnership suggests the formation of a 
special relationship between Turkey and the EU which would fall short of full-
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membership but would still promote a closer relationship than the Customs Union. The 
privileged partnership would entail the deepening of EU-Turkey relations in three 
aspects. First of all, the free market area which was activated with the conclusion of the 
Customs Union in 1995 could be expanded to cover all goods. Turkey and the EU could 
work in cooperation to promote civil society, environmental protection, health care and 
education and to foster small and medium-sized enterprises. Secondly, Turkey could be 
further incorporated into the CFSP and ESDP. Finally, the collaboration between 
Turkey and the EU could be intensified among the offices and institutions under the 
Justice and Home Affairs to fight against terrorism, extremism and organized crimes.157 
Even though, the concept of privileged partnership foresees a significant enhancement 
of cooperation in various fields, it would deprive Turkey of many rights that are to arise 
from full-membership. Hence the idea of privileged partnership is strongly rejected by 
Turkey and stated firmly that any alternative to full-membership of the European Union 
will not be accepted.158 However, the CDU/CSU has kept to their privileged partnership 
rhetoric so far. Merkel stated in 2004 that they wanted “a special partnership, a third 
way with Turkey.”159 In 2009, before the federal elections in Germany, she showed that 
her proposition for a ‘privileged partnership’ has not changed when she suggested that 
“it [did] not make any sense for the EU to continuously expand if it leaves the Union 
unable to operate” and added that she preferred a privileged partnership for Turkey 
instead of full membership.160 Stoiber supported Merkel’s proposition and claimed that 
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he would do “everything within his legal power” to achieve a privileged partnership 
with Turkey.161 
 
The privileged partnership rhetoric is repeatedly articulated in the party 
programs of CDU and the coalition agreements between CDU/CSU and SPD, and 
CDU/CSU and FDP. In the basic policy program of the CDU, it is argued that the full-
membership cannot be taken as the only option for new members, and a privileged 
partnership is the right solution in the Turkish case.162 The same rhetoric is preserved in 
the wording of the coalition agreements with both SPD and FDP. Even though, the SPD 
had a much assertive position towards Turkey and supported the full-membership of 
Turkey to the EU, due to pressure from CDU/CSU, the privileged partnership was 
proposed as an alternative to full-membership in the 2005 coalition agreement. It was 
stated in the coalition agreement that:  
 
Should the EU not have the capacity to absorb Turkey, or Turkey not be able to 
comply completely and in full with all of the commitments which membership 
entails, Turkey must be linked to the European structures as closely as possible 
and in a way that further develop its privileged relationship with Europe.163 
 
The coalition agreement further stressed the open-ended nature of the accession 
negotiations between Turkey and the EU. The very same rhetoric was adopted in the 
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2009 coalition agreement between CDU/CSU and FDP.164 In both agreements, the 
absorption capacity of the EU and the full compliance of the membership criteria by 
Turkey are taken as basis for Turkey’s full-membership.  
 
The inclusion of Turkey into the EU as a full member is regarded as threatening 
to the European integration and the operation of the EU by the CDU/CSU, and the 
staunch opposition of these parties to a prospective Turkish membership, which is 
mainly based on identity concerns, has not been abolished so far. However, similar to 
SPD and the Greens, the CDU/CSU cannot underestimate the benefits of Turkey, tied 
strongly to the EU, in terms of security and defense. Therefore, it has been strongly 
stressed in the concept of the privileged partnership that close cooperation between 
Turkey and the EU in CFSP, ESDP and JHA is vital. Merkel has reiterated in her 
speeches several times that Germany wanted to have close relations with Turkey, 
because Turkey was excessively significant for “security and geopolitical reasons”165. 
The military capacities of the country, its NATO membership, the mediator role it has 
been embarked in the post-Cold War system, in addition to its role in the energy 
security of the EU, have made Turkey an indispensable partner for the EU in security 
matters. Therefore, the rigid opposition of CDU/CSU towards Turkey’s EU 
membership might be replaced by a more moderate position in the forthcoming years. 
For the time being, Merkel has reassured Turkey that she won’t block Turkey’s 
accession negotiations and pacta sunt servanda will apply166 and this position still 
prevails.  
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To recapitulate, the opposition of CDU/CSU against the Turkish accession is 
shaped by identity-based concerns. Turkey is considered as incompatible with the 
European identity and culture. Particularly, in terms of religion-based differences, 
Turkey does not comply with the European identity, considering that Christianity is one 
of the keystones which construct this identity. The Christian-based values are especially 
stressed by CDU/CSU. The emphasis on these values is one of the distinguishing 
elements that shape the identity of these parties. However, Turkey is still regarded as an 
important partner in European security. Therefore, close cooperation with Turkey in 
CFSP, ESDP and JHA is desired. In order to facilitate cooperation in these fields, 
CDU/CSU suggest that Turkey is anchored to the EU through a ‘privileged partnership’. 
This alternative to full-membership will anchor Turkey to the EU without including 
Turkey into the decision-making mechanisms.  
3.3. Alliance ‘90/The Greens 
The position of the Greens on the Turkish issue is very much in conformity with 
that of SPD. Similar to SPD, the Greens have been a strong supporter of Turkey’s EU 
bid. The determinants that shape the attitude of the Greens on this issue and the reasons 
for their support to Turkey’s full-membership are mainly based on economic and 
security concerns like SPD. The Greens formed a coalition with the SPD in 1998 and 
stayed in power until 2005, and influenced the decisions regarding Turkey’s EU 
accession which were taken during the term of the red-green coalition. Joschka Fischer, 
the leader of the Green party, who served as the foreign minister of the coalition 
government, was very influential in the pro-Turkish attitude of the government and he 
stood out with his evident support to Turkey’s EU membership. His rhetoric on the 
Turkish issue was very akin to that of Schröder. Like Schröder, he expressed frequently 
that the inclusion of Turkey to the EU was vital for the European security system. The 
security concerns were at the heart of Fischer’s pro-Turkish rhetoric. As 
abovementioned, in an article he published in 2004, Fischer drew attention to the 
strategic role Turkey would play in the European security structure in the aftermath of 
the 9/11 attacks. He claimed that during the Cold War, “Turkey [laid] on the fringe”, 
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whereas in the post-Cold War system it was “in the center of [the EU] security”.167 
Turkey, therefore, was to be included into the EU system at all costs with full-
membership. Fischer criticized CDU/CSU for their opposition towards Turkey’s EU 
bid. He argued that “the promises that [had] been made by the German governments for 
over the past 43 years” were to be kept and blamed Merkel and Stoiber for being 
“blind”168 in their attitude. When it was decided to start accession negotiations with 
Turkey on 3 October 2005, Fischer expressed his contentment as: 
 
Europe is the winner today. What has been promised for decades is now 
entering its decisive phase, which will last a long time. […] The Eastern 
Mediterranean will be crucial for peace in the 21st century, not only for Turkey, 
but for Europe as a whole.169  
 
Another determinant for the support on the side of the Greens is the prospective 
economic benefits that Turkey’s membership would bring. As Fischer argued in his 
article, the membership of Turkey would provide the EU with a secure and stable 
market for foreign direct investment and it would be a gateway to other markets in the 
Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East.170 Furthermore, Turkey would provide the EU 
with “young and skilled labor force” and it would bring “extensive economic 
development potential to Europe”, and as a result the inclusion of Turkey would not be 
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an “asset for the Europe’s security only but the EU would also benefit economically”171 
from Turkey’s inclusion.  
 
The economic and security concerns, however, are not the only determinants in 
shaping the preferences of the Greens on the Turkish issue. In addition to the 
prospective economic and security benefits, the prioritization of multiculturalism in the 
party agenda is another factor which affects the preference formation towards Turkey. 
Contrary to CDU/CSU, the cultural differences of Turkey do not constitute a source of 
concern for the Greens. This liberal approach of the party is also evident in its position 
towards immigration. Unlike CDU/CSU, immigration is not perceived as a threat to 
German society but as an asset. Like SPD, the Greens support the full-membership of 
Turkey to the EU, and any alternative to full-membership is not considered acceptable. 
They argue that the accession negotiations with Turkey should be “reliable and fair”, 
and a privileged partnership would mean “the breach of promise” given to Turkey forty 
years ago.172 In line with Fischer, the current party leader, Cem Özdemir, has opposed 
to the privileged partnership proposal of the CDU/CSU, and stated that the goal of the 
accession negotiations is the full-membership of Turkey.173 
 
In sum, the pro-Turkish attitude of the Greens is very much similar to SPD. The 
economic and security benefits of Turkey’s inclusion, together with the liberal approach 
of the party in terms of tolerance to different cultures and its positive attitude towards 
immigration and immigrants are the main determinants which shape the supportive 
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attitude of the Greens towards Turkey’s membership. Turkey’s central role in the 
European security in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks are especially emphasized. Besides, 
Turkey is regarded as essential for the EU, since Turkey would provide a secure market 
for foreign direct investment and supply labor force to the EU, as well as be a gateway 
to other markets in the region.  
3.4. Free Democratic Party (FDP) 
The FDP does not have a clear-cut position towards Turkey’s EU membership as 
the other parties. It is neither an ardent supporter of Turkey like SPD and the Greens, 
nor does it oppose to Turkey’s EU bid as the CDU/CSU. The position of FDP could be 
regarded as relatively neutral on the Turkish issue. According to the political party 
position, the prospects of Turkey’s EU membership depend on the fulfillment of the 
accession criteria and the absorption capacity of the EU.174 Nevertheless, it does not 
propose a privileged partnership if Turkey cannot fulfill the criteria or if the EU does 
not have the capacity to absorb Turkey like CDU/CSU. On the other hand, it has not 
argued for the full-membership of Turkey as overtly as SPD and the Greens. Thus far 
the statements as regards to this issue have focused on the reforms Turkey has 
undertaken to comply with the Copenhagen criteria. While the reforms in the 
constitution and legislation have been appreciated, Turkey is encouraged to continue 
with the reform program by the FDP leader Guido Westerwelle to promote “freedom of 
opinion, press and religion” which are considered the cornerstones of common 
European values”.175  
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The rhetoric of Westerwelle, who became the foreign minister of the CDU/CSU 
- FDP coalition government, has indicated changes in the attitude of FDP. In a visit to 
Ankara, the foreign minister showed clearly that FDP would not go along with the 
CDU/CSU policy towards Turkey. The FDP leader promised that Turkey’s EU bid 
would be considered “without prejudice”176. Even though, the same rhetoric is adopted 
in the coalition agreement between CDU/CSU and FDP as regards to Turkey’s EU 
membership as the grand coalition agreement, which favors a privileged partnership if 
Turkey fails to comply with the accession criteria or if the EU cannot absorb Turkey, 
the attitude of Westerwelle seems more moderate than his coalition partners. In this 
sense, Westerwelle might follow the line of his predecessor, Steienmeier and balance 
the rigid opposition of CSU towards Turkey. The economic interests seem to have 
played a role in Westerwelle’s position towards Turkey since during his visit to Turkey; 
he announced that “Germany had a great interest in maintaining good relations with 
Turkey, partly because of the economic ties between the countries”.177 Since the 
position of FDP towards Turkey’s EU bid is not clear yet, it is hard to evaluate the 
determinants that shape its attitude on this issue. However, it is relatively evident that 
the identity based concerns are not extremely influential in shaping the preference of 
FDP on the Turkish issue. Rather its attitude might be explained from an 
intergovernmentalist perspective, since based on the rhetoric of Westerwelle, the 
material interests seem to have affected the preference formation of the FDP.  
 
Conclusion: 
 
This chapter argued and analyzed the extent to which Turkey’s EU membership has 
created a rift among the major political parties in Germany, namely SPD, CDU/CSU, 
the Greens and FDP. The parties’ preferences differ on several issues with respect to 
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Turkey, yet the main division is on the nature of the partnership to be established 
between Turkey and the EU. Whereas SPD and the Greens strongly support Turkey’s 
inclusion into the EU structure as a full member, CDU/CSU favor the formation of a 
privileged partnership between Turkey and the EU. FDP has not yet explicitly stated its 
position regarding the nature of the relationship. Another division exists on the nature of 
the determinants that shape the attitude of these parties towards Turkey’s EU bid. While 
utility-driven concerns are the main determinants for SPD and the Greens, the identity-
based concerns define the stance of CDU/CSU. As for the FDP, it is early to make a 
clear-cut assumption, but it seems likely that the utility-driven concerns might be 
effective in the preference formation of the party. Considering the nature of factors 
which determine the position of these major parties, it can be argued that the 
intergovernmentalist account explains the position of SPD, the Greens and the FDP 
more thoroughly, whereas the constructivist account provides more exhaustive 
explanations for the opposition of CDU/CSU. In fact the material and ideational 
concerns are in interplay with one another in shaping the position of the German 
political parties. Each party perceives some material and ideational concerns from 
Turkey’s accession; however the relative influence of these concerns on the preference 
formation is not identical. While for SPD, the Greens and FDP, the material benefits are 
prioritized over ideational concerns, CDU/CSU preferences are primarily shaped by 
ideational concerns. Even though, CDU/CSU also perceive material benefits from 
Turkish accession especially in terms of security, their stance is not primarily shaped by 
these prospective benefits, as much as SPD and the Greens. 
 
According to the utility-driven explanations, the military capacity, geostrategic 
location and the mediator role of Turkey make the country an indispensable partner for 
the European security system. The economic potential with a credible and stable 
market, attractive for foreign direct investment and the labor force that Turkey would 
provide make it an important partner for the European economy. The important role of 
Turkey in the European security system is also affirmed by Merkel several times in her 
rhetoric, but CDU/CSU have kept their staunch opposition to Turkey’s full-membership 
to the EU. Instead they suggest a privileged partnership which will enable the EU to 
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establish close cooperation with Turkey especially in the CFSP, ESDP and JHA of the 
EU without including the country to the decision-making mechanism. Even though, 
Turkey has rejected the idea so far, CDU/CSU has retained their proposal for a 
privileged partnership and their rigid opposition to Turkey’s full-membership.  
 
The conflicting attitudes of the major parties on the Turkish issue have been 
reflected on the government policies and affected the decisions related to Turkey’s EU 
bid. The decisions that were taken during the Kohl government, which opposed to 
Turkey’s EU accession transformed into the 1997 Luxembourg Summit decision which 
excluded Turkey from the next enlargement round. On the other hand, the decisions 
taken during the red-green coalition favored Turkey’s EU bid and resulted in turning 
points such as 1999 Helsinki Summit decision to grant Turkey the candidate status. In 
addition to the decisions related to Turkey’s EU membership, the decisions concerning 
the Turkish immigrants in Germany, such as the revisions of the citizenship law, has 
been affected by the division between the SPD-Greens and CDU/CSU.  
 
            In addition to their impact on the national preference formation, the political 
parties’ position and preferences towards Turkey are also important in assessing the 
public’s position on the Turkish issue. The attitude of domestic voters in issues related 
to the EU is considerably moulded by the elite cues.178 In this sense, the political parties 
shape the public opinion towards Turkish accession to a certain degree. The public, in 
turn, influences the party preferences through elections. The next chapter addresses the 
German public’s support for Turkey’s accession because the public opinion is important 
to shape both the political party preferences and the national preferences on Turkish 
membership. 
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CHAPTER IV 
An Analysis of Public Opinion in Germany towards Turkey’s EU Membership 
This chapter discusses the public support for Turkey’s accession and analyzes 
the determinants that mould the public opinion with respect to Turkey from a utilitarian 
and identity-based approach. Public opinion is an important element in determining 
both the party preferences and national preferences towards European integration and 
enlargement. The role of the public was very trivial in the foundation of the European 
Union and the integration in the successive three decades. The European Project was 
mainly driven by the political and technocratic elite through a “permissive consensus”, 
and public opinion and support for integration were issues that received almost no 
attention.179 Even though, the European Parliament was founded in 1957, up until 1975, 
the members of the parliament were appointed by the member states. The first direct 
elections for the European Parliament took place in 1979. The direct elections gave the 
European public a limited sphere to exert influence on the integration. However, since 
the role of the EP was constrained to an advisory body with very slight impact on the 
decision-making, the public sphere was also very restricted. The democratic deficit, 
which is still an unresolved problem, was acute until the late 1980s. The institutional 
reforms proposed in the 1987 Single European Act helped to expand the power of the 
EP in the decision-making and hence provided the public with a broader sphere for 
“institutionalized deliberation and decision-making”180.  
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However, the institutional revisions and the EP alone cannot account for the 
increase in the role of the public in influencing the European integration. In addition to 
the EP where the public could have an indirect say in issues related to European 
integration, the member state citizens started to exert influence on through the domestic 
channels, namely the national government. In line with the intergovernmentalist account 
of Moravcsik, in democratic societies, the public can exert influence on the decision-
making through “domestic institutions and practices of political representation”.181 The 
governments are constrained by the interests and preferences of the public, since they 
need the support of the domestic voters to stay in power.182 The influence of public on 
the domestic preference formation in issues related to integration grew as the 
developments in the EU started to impact the lives of the ordinary citizens increasingly. 
However, the relative impact of the public is still limited. Only when the majority of the 
public is united in support or opposition to a certain policy, then the public is more 
likely to influence the national preference formation through elections. In issues related 
to the European integration, the public pressure is more evident in terms of opposition 
to certain policies, which are perceived as a threat to the economic and social well-being 
of the public. Especially since the early 1990s, the governments are perceptibly 
constrained by the opposition of domestic voters at home in EU related issues. The 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty is a clear manifestation of this trend. The referendums 
held in France, the Netherlands and Ireland demonstrated a rigid opposition to the 
Treaty. Due to the opposition, the ratification process was halted and it lasted two years 
for the Treaty to be completely ratified. The public constraint on the governments is 
likely to increase in major developments in the EU like the Turkish membership. France 
and Austria have announced that they will hold referendums on the Turkish 
membership, and let the public decide on the Turkish issue. The increase in the 
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influence of the public in enlargement related issues is not very much in advantage of 
Turkey. The Eurobarometers show that there is an increasing opposition in some 
member states against Turkey’s EU bid. It is clearly demonstrated that the full-
membership of Turkey to the EU is not an acceptable option. The public opinion in 
Germany on the Turkish issue is not much different from France and Austria with an 
increasing rate of opposition. According to the Eurobarometer 66, 78% of the Germans 
oppose Turkey’s EU membership and only 16% is in favor of Turkey’s membership.183 
German public opinion and the factors that drive support or opposition for the Turkish 
accession will be discussed and analyzed in this chapter from a utility-driven and 
identity-based perspective. First the utility-driven and identity-based approaches to 
European integration will be explained briefly. The approaches of Gabel and Palmer, 
and McLaren will be used in explaining public support for Turkish membership along 
with liberal intergovernmentalism and constructivism.   
 
The utilitarian model, proposed by Gabel and Palmer to explain the public 
support for European integration, suggests that “the welfare gains from integrative 
policy” determine the attitude of the public.184 According to Gabel and Palmer, “the 
level of education”, “the occupational skills” and “the income level” are the main 
factors that influence a person’s support for European integration.185 The liberalization 
of the labor market introduced another level of competition and made some workers 
redundant. It eased the migration of unskilled workers from less developed member 
states to developed countries such as Germany. The immigrant workers constitute a 
threat to the workers with low levels of education and occupational skills in host 
countries, because these workers can easily be replaced by the immigrant workers.186 In 
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addition, market liberalization enabled the business to move from one member state to 
another where the companies can find cheap labor187 and created a second threat for the 
workers in the developed countries. Gabel and Palmer list the income level as the 
second factor that affects a person’s support for integration. According to the authors, 
the liberalization of the capital market and the European Monetary Union influence the 
public support. The people with a high income level can benefit more from the market 
liberalization because “more open financial markets” provide better investment 
opportunities, whereas people with low income level are likely to be harmed by these 
economic policies because “they depend primarily on wages from labor for their 
welfare” and “capital liberalization reduces their welfare”.188 Furthermore, according to 
Gabel and Palmer, the capital mobility and European Monetary System limit the social 
welfare spending, which is another threat to the low-income citizens, because these 
citizens depend on the social welfare spending.189 In short, the people with “lower-level 
job skills and at the lowest income levels” are threatened most by the economic policies 
in the EU,190 therefore they are more likely to oppose the European integration and any 
policy that influences their welfare gains.  
 
In the light of the utility-based approaches, it is highly likely that people who are 
threatened by Turkey’s membership in economic terms will oppose Turkey’s EU bid. 
One of the greatest concerns regarding Turkey’s membership is the flux of large 
numbers of Turkish workers into the developed member states. The immigration of 
Turkish workers to developed member states such as Germany would create negative 
outcomes for the low-income unskilled workers in the host countries. In addition, the 
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companies in the member states would be encouraged to move their business to Turkey 
for lower wages to decrease their production costs. It is feared that Turkey will be a 
source of unskilled and cheap labor, a fact which would most threaten the lower-income 
unskilled workers in the host countries.191 These concerns especially hold true for 
Germany, which has already experienced a significant flow of Turkish workers since 
the 1960s. The German public fears of another flux of Turkish workers. They are 
concerned that the Turkish workers will replace them in the job market. They regard 
Turkish candidacy as “a strong potential threat to group resources such as social 
security benefits and jobs”192 and therefore oppose it. Considering the increasing level 
of unemployment in the country, it is likely that the utility-driven concerns will shape 
the German public attitude towards Turkey’s EU bid substantially. The public is already 
concerned about the unemployment rates and the economy. When asked about the most 
important concerns facing their country, 58% of the German public listed 
unemployment as the most significant concern, and 46% named the economic situation 
in the country.193 The unemployment level and the economic situation in the country 
influence the support of the public for European integration and Turkish membership.  
 
According to McLaren, Hooghe and Marks, De Vreese and Carey, the utility-
driven approaches are considered to be insufficient to explain the support and 
opposition to the European integration and enlargement in all respects. The utility-
driven approaches alone fail to provide thorough explanations for the rejection of 
Turkey’s full-membership bid, whereas other countries which have a fairly worse 
economy than Turkey with high potential of immigrants are granted membership. The 
accession of Central and Eastern European countries in a short time after their 
application forms a good example, a fact which cannot be explained through utility-
driven rationale. It was obvious that the economic situation in most of these countries 
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were far worse than Turkey.194 In this sense, their inclusion would pose a greater threat 
on the job market and economies of the developed member states. However, the EU 
was not as hesitant to enlarge to the Eastern Europe as it is towards Turkey. In order to 
explain these discrepancies in the responses of member states on the Turkish issue, 
utility-driven explanations should be complemented with identity-based approach. 
According to this approach, the public’s support to the EU related issues is also 
determined by the perception of cultural threat posed by further integration and 
enlargement. In contrary to Gabel and Palmer, McLaren, Hooghe and Marks, De Vreese 
and Carey argue that the “symbolic threat” (i.e. threat to culture and the way of life)195 
that integration and enlargement poses, outweighs the perceived economic threat.196 In 
line with this rationale, the inclusion of the Central and Eastern European countries to 
the EU can be explained through the “kinship” between these countries and the other 
EU member states.197 The Central and Eastern European countries are regarded as an 
integral part of the “European family of nations”198 with the same ethnic, historical, 
cultural and religious background. In this sense, they belong to the collective European 
identity, and this seems to be a sufficient reason to justify their accession to the EU. On 
the other hand, Turkey is not regarded as a part of the European family because it 
doesn’t share the historical, cultural and religious heritage of other member states, but 
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regarded only as a strategic partner to Europe in economic and security aspects.199 Its 
inclusion to the EU is essential for the economic and security aspirations of Europe. At 
the state-level the inclusion of Turkey can be justified through the economic and 
security benefits Turkish membership is to provide. However, it is highly unlikely that 
these benefits will constitute a motive for support to Turkey’s EU bid at the public 
level. The perceived differences in the Turkish identity concern the public more than the 
economic and security benefits of Turkey’s inclusion. According to McLaren: 
 
In contrast to the way that many EU official might treat the country – in terms 
of its level of democracy, economic development etc. – EU citizens are likely to 
see it also in terms of the people who constitute the country (i.e. Turks).200 
 
The indifference of the public towards the security benefits of Turkey’s 
inclusion is also demonstrated in the Eurobarometers. The rate of the respondents who 
have stated that Turkey’s inclusion would strengthen security in the region is far 
outweighed by the people who think that the membership of Turkey cannot be allowed 
because of the cultural differences between Turkey and the EU member states.201 The 
perceived cultural threat is a major determinant in the formation of German public 
attitude towards Turkey’s membership. The Turkish population in Germany plays an 
eminent role in shaping the public preference in this sense. The Turkish immigrants are 
still regarded as ‘the other’, ‘the foreigner’ in Germany. The differences in their culture, 
language, and religion are considered to be incompatible with the German and Western 
identity. These anti-immigrant sentiments among the German public translate into 
opposition to Turkish membership. McLaren claims that the role of immigration in 
determining the public attitude towards Turkey’s EU accession is decisive. She argues 
that “high-levels of Turkish migration have created a climate of perceived threat to in-
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group resources and culture” and this threat is embodied as opposition to Turkey’s 
membership.202 Ugur supports this rationale by stating that the societal forces in Europe 
regard immigration as “a threat to established visions of identity and societal 
integrity.”203 In this respect, in Germany, the country with the highest number of 
Turkish immigrants in Europe, it is highly likely that anti-immigrant feelings act as an 
impediment against Turkey’s EU bid. In the following section, the public 
support/opposition for the Turkish membership will be analyzed both from a utilitarian 
and constructivist account in association with the anti-immigrant sentiments. It will be 
argued the public preference formation in Germany is both affected by the economic 
and identity concerns, and the high levels of migration and the resultant anti-immigrant 
sentiments are influential in these concerns. This analysis will be made in the light of 
the quantitative data provided by Eurobarometer 66.204 The Eurobarometer has its own 
restrictions and  
4.1. Utility-Driven Concerns 
The liberalization of the capital and labor markets enabled the move of labor, 
capital and business from one member state to another, which has direct influences on 
the EU citizens. The impact of the market liberalization on the EU citizens differs 
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according to their level of education and occupational skills.205 Citizens with higher 
levels of education and income, and better occupational skills benefit from the market 
liberalization with better investment opportunities. On the other hand, the people with 
lower levels of education, income and occupational skills are influenced negatively by 
the market liberalization. They face the threat of losing their jobs to immigrant workers. 
They feel insecure about their jobs, income and security benefits. In addition, as a result 
of market liberalization it is easier for the companies to move to other member states in 
search of lower production costs, which as a result deprives the unskilled workers at 
home from potential job opportunities.206 Consequently, the effects of market 
liberalization on the socioeconomic situations of EU citizens influence their attitude 
towards European integration. If people benefit from the liberalization of the capital and 
labor markets, they are more likely to support the integration. However, if they are to 
suffer from the market liberalization in terms of job and income loss, people will oppose 
further integration.207  
 
The economic concerns play a significant role on the public preference 
formation towards Turkey’s membership in Germany. In line with the abovementioned 
rationale, the German citizens who perceive the Turkish membership as a threat on their 
jobs, income and security benefits, are likely to oppose Turkey’s EU bid. The 
immigration of the Turkish workers as a result of membership is the main concern 
among the German citizens. If high numbers of Turkish workers immigrate to Germany 
again, the job market, the national economy and the social welfare system will be 
overburdened. The Turkish workers will replace the German workers; they will share 
the social security benefits, and therefore pose a threat to the “in-group resources”208. 
The fear of immigration and the perceived threat on the individual socioeconomic 
                                                 
205 Gabel, Matthew. “Gabel, Matthew. “Public Support for European Integration: An 
Empirical Test of Five Theories.” p. 4. 
  
206 Ibid.  
 
207 Ibid.  
 
208 McLaren, Lauren. “Explaining Opposition to Turkish Membership of the EU.” p. 
254. 
  79 
situation and the national economy are the main determinants which shape the public 
opposition. Particularly, the German citizens with lower levels of education, income and 
occupational skills are more likely to oppose to Turkey’s EU membership. The results 
of Eurobarometer 66 are very much in line with this logic of thought. The survey 
reveals that the fear of immigration is a main concern among the respondents. The 
respondents were asked to express their opinion on the following statement: 
 
• Turkey’s joining could risk favoring immigration to more developed 
countries in the EU. (Eurobarometer 66, QA34.6) 
 
78% of the respondents agreed that the inclusion of Turkey would trigger 
immigration into developed countries. Only 19% disagreed with the statement. The 
percentage of the respondents who agreed with this statement was 71% in the 
Eurobarometer 63 which was conducted only two years earlier than the Eurobarometer 
66.209 Due to the decreasing population growth rate, the immigration of the Turkish 
labor force into developed EU member states is considered to be a positive impact of 
the Turkish accession in the long run.210 The respondents were asked to assess the 
impact of Turkey’s inclusion to rejuvenate the ageing population in the EU member 
states, most of the respondents did not agree on this statement. The statement was as 
follows: 
 
• Turkey’s accession would favor the rejuvenation of an ageing European 
population. (Eurobarometer 66, Q34.5) 
 
58% of the German respondents disagreed with this statement, while only 32% 
supported this claim. Based on the data, it can be argued that the negative impacts of the 
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Turkish membership, namely immigration and its perceived threats on the job and 
income security of the German citizens are more influential in shaping the public 
attitude on the Turkish issue in the short term than the long-term positive impacts for 
the German labor market.  
 
The economic impacts of Turkish membership are not limited with the 
immigration of Turkish workers into developed EU member states. The economic level 
in Turkey is also considered as a threat on the member state economies. It is argued that 
because of its small economy, the impact of Turkish membership on the EU economy 
will be “minimal”.211 On the other hand, Turkey will benefit from the EU economy 
through the structural funds. In this sense, Turkey’s membership is perceived to be a 
burden on the EU budget.212 The material costs of Turkey’s inclusion also shape the 
public attitude towards Turkey. It is mainly the net contributors to the EU budget, who 
pay for the costs of enlargement.213 Hooghe and Marks argue that the public of the net 
contributor member states can be expected to oppose to the European integration.214 
Considering that Germany is the largest net contributor to the EU budget, the German 
public is likely to oppose to the Turkish membership because of the financial burden it 
would impose on the German economy. The data provided by Eurobarometer 66 
supports this claim. The majority of the respondents argued that Turkey has to improve 
its economic level significantly to be granted the EU membership. The Eurobarometer 
statement was as: 
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• To join the EU in about 10 years, Turkey will have to significantly 
improve the state of its economy. (Eurobarometer 66, QA34.8) 
 
83% of the German respondents agree with this statement, whereas only 8% of 
the respondents disagree. In addition to the lessening of the financial burden of Turkish 
inclusion on the EU budget, the improvement in the Turkish economy would lead to a 
decrease in the immigration of Turkish labor to the more developed EU member states. 
In this regard, the concerns stemming from Turkey’s economic level are both related to 
“personal economic prospects” and “national economic prospects”215.  
 
The economic situation and the unemployment rates in Germany is another 
determinant shaping the public attitude towards Turkey. The German public is already 
concerned about the current economic situation in their country and the increasing 
unemployment levels. The future prospects of the economic situation and 
unemployment is also expected to deteriorate. Therefore, they are likely to oppose to the 
Turkey’s inclusion, which is supposed to lay additional burden on the national economy 
and the labor market. According to Hooghe and Marks, “citizens who feel confident 
about the economic future – personally and for their country – are likely to regard 
European integration in a positive light, while those who are fearful will lean towards 
Euroscepticism”.216 From this respect, it can be suggested that the current economic 
concerns and the future economic prospects affect the preference formation of the 
German public on the Turkish issue. The survey results show that the economic 
situation in the country and the unemployment are the main concerns of the German 
public. The Eurobarometer question is as follows: 
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• What do you think are the two most important issues facing (our country) 
at the moment? (Eurobarometer 66, QA23) 
 
The majority of the respondents in Germany with 70% regarded unemployment 
as the most important issue facing their country. 93% of the respondents judged the 
current employment situation in Germany as bad. The pessimism about the employment 
situation in the country is well above the EU average and the other member states. In 
addition, most of the respondents foresaw no considerable developments regarding the 
employment situation in Germany in the future. When the respondents were asked: 
 
• What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will they be 
better, worse or the same, when it comes to the employment situation in 
(our country)? (Eurobarometer 66, QA4) 
 
The results revealed that the respondents were as pessimistic about the 
employment situation in Germany as they are about the current situation. 46% of the 
respondents stated that the employment situation in Germany would deteriorate in the 
next twelve months. The other issue which concerns the German public after the 
employment situation is the national economic situation. According to the 29% of the 
respondents, the second important issue facing their country is the economic situation. 
55% respondents deemed the current economic situation in Germany as bad, and 46% 
of them expected a further deterioration in the next twelve years. The education level 
and the individual employment situation of the respondents influenced their judgment.  
Both in questions concerning the employment and the economic situation, the answers 
differed according to the level of education and the occupational status of respondents. 
People with higher level of education and with a good occupational status judged the 
employment and economic level in their country relatively good, whereas people with a 
lower education level and people who were unemployed considered that the 
employment and economic situations in Germany was rather bad.217 Based on the 
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survey data, it is clear that the German public does not “feel confident about the 
economic future”218 and therefore the German citizens are likely to oppose the 
European integration and the inclusion of Turkey to the EU. The respondents with 
lower level of education and occupational skills are to oppose to Turkey’s membership 
more rigidly than the respondents with higher levels of education and occupational 
skills. 
 
To sum, the majority of the German public is reluctant about the inclusion of 
Turkey to the EU, since they perceive it as a threat to their economic well-being both at 
the individual and the country level. The German citizens fear that the inclusion of 
Turkey will lead to further unemployment and lower-wages. The current employment 
and economic situation in the country is perceived as bad by the majority of the public, 
and they don’t expect an improvement in the current situation. Most of the respondents 
were pessimistic that the current situation would even deteriorate in the future. Turkey’s 
membership would further complicate the current problems, because granting the right 
of free movement to Turkish workers will result in high-levels of immigration to 
Germany. Furthermore, the Turkish membership will be a burden on the German 
economy, because the costs of its inclusion in terms of structural funds will be paid by 
the net contributor member states, the largest being Germany. These economic concerns 
shape the attitude of German public towards Turkey to a great extent, and they are in 
line with the economic rationality aspect of the equation.  
4.2. Identity-Based Concerns  
The identity-based concerns play a prominent role in the formation of public 
attitude towards enlargement. The perceived threat to culture and national identity 
sometimes outweighs the perceived threat to economic well-being of citizens. McLaren 
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suggests that the “fear of, or hostility toward, other cultures”219 determine the citizens’ 
attitude towards the European integration. She further argues that especially in the 
Turkish case, the perceived “threat to culture and way of life” in the member states is 
substantial.220 Turkey is perceived to be “too different” than the EU member states in 
terms of its “culture, social norms and attitudes”221, alongside with religious and 
historical differences. As abovementioned, the collective European identity is 
constructed through a “common historical heritage, a shared religious experience, 
democracy”222 and human rights. Turkey does not fit into this definition, since it does 
not share the historical heritage and the Christian experiences, therefore the social 
norms and values of other member states. In fact, Turkey has been defined as “the 
other” against which the European identity is formed both during the Ottoman and the 
Republican Era.223 The perception of the Turk as the other in the European identity has 
not changed drastically, ‘the Turk’ is still perceived as the other in the European identity 
definition, and this fact influences the preferences of the member states towards 
Turkey’s accession.224 The religious differences are especially significant in 
constructing the European ‘self’ and the Turkish ‘other’. Even if it is not “the 
established religion in contemporary Europe” as it was in the past, Christianity is still 
one of the core elements of the European identity.225 The Christian element in the 
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collective European identity, acts as another impediment for Turkey, a country with a 
predominantly Muslim population.  
 
The immigrant Turkish population in Europe helps to reinforce the differences in 
the European and Turkish identity. The Turkish immigrants are not well integrated into 
the host countries’ societies due to inefficient and insufficient integration policies 
adopted by the governments or in some cases because of the reluctance of the 
immigrant groups to integrate. The Turkish immigrants are still considered as ‘guest 
workers’ or ‘foreigners’, even though they have been permanent residents of the host 
countries for almost 40 years. The perceived cultural and religious differences between 
these groups and the societies of the host countries are reflected on the public attitude 
towards the Turkish membership. Considering that the majority of the Turkish 
immigrants residing in Europe concentrate in Germany, it is highly likely that the 
perceived cultural threat plays an important role in determining the German public 
attitude on the Turkish issue. The Turks are still referred to as the Ausländer or 
Gastarbeiter in Germany. The integration policies pursued so far are inefficient to 
expedite the full integration of the Turkish community to the German society. Even 
though, certain steps have been taken to expedite integration such as the revision of the 
laws pertaining to the status of immigrants and citizenship, these attempts are usually 
not steady and are very much dependent upon party politics. The public seems divided 
on the issue. While some German citizens support the integration of the Turkish 
immigrants to the society, the number of the people who oppose both the presence of 
the Turkish community in Germany and the Turkish membership to the EU increase. 
The cultural and religious differences between the German/European identity and the 
Turkish identity seem irreconcilable to allow for a Turkish accession. The perceived 
cultural threats influence the German public attitude towards Turkey’s EU bid along 
with the utility-driven concerns. Turkey is not considered to be a part of the collective 
European identity because it does not share the common characteristics that construct 
this identity. The Eurobarometer 66 supports this claim. The majority of the German 
respondents stated that Turkey was culturally too different than the EU member states, 
and due to these cultural differences, the inclusion of Turkey to the EU should not be 
allowed. The survey question was as follows: 
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• The cultural differences between Turkey and the EU member states are 
too significant to allow it to join the EU. (Eurobarometer 66, QA34.4) 
 
74% of the respondents agreed with this statement, and only 24% disagreed. The 
rate of the respondents that agreed with this statement was 66% in Eurobarometer 63, 
which was conducted in 2005. The results to this question in other member states which 
oppose Turkish membership due to perceived cultural threat are more or less similar to 
those of Germany. In France for example, the respondents who agreed with this 
statement rated 65%, and in Austria 84%. The differences in the religious experiences 
and the treatment to women seem to be the main factors that determine the hostility 
among the public towards the Turkish culture. McLaren argues that “its religious roots” 
and “the assumptions about the treatment to women” are the main determinants that 
differentiate Turkey from the EU members.226 Kramer claims that Turkey is “too 
Muslim to fit into the EU scheme.”227 Considering the fact that Christianity is one of the 
key stones in constructing the collective European identity, the inclusion of a country 
with a large Muslim population is perceived as a challenge to the core of this identity. 
Different religions engender different traditions and cultures, and in this line of thought 
the integration of a predominantly Muslim population into the EU is considered to pose 
a threat on the European culture and way of life. Eurobarometer 63 included a question 
on the religious roots of Turkey and the possible impacts of this on the EU member 
states. The statement was: 
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• Turkey’s accession to the European Union would favor the mutual 
comprehension of European and Muslim values.228(Eurobarometer 63, 
QB3.4) 
 
60% of the German respondents disagreed with this statement. In contrary to 
state-level approaches to Turkish membership, which praise the role of Turkey in 
mediating between the Islamic and the Western world, the religious differences cause 
skepticism at the public level.  
 
As above mentioned, the public opposition to Turkey’s accession is correlated 
with the prevalent anti-immigrant sentiments in Germany. The cultural and religious 
differences between the Turkish and German communities have resulted in hostility 
towards the immigrants along with other reasons. The integration policies adopted so far 
have been inefficient. It is still an unresolved question whether the full-integration of 
the Turkish immigrants to the German society is desired. Even though, political parties 
like SPD and the Greens and the public to some extent support the integration. The 
opposition to integration cannot be underestimated, because some integration attempts 
have been precluded by the opposing groups. The rejection of the dual citizenship is a 
good example of this approach. The integration of immigrants is even considered as a 
threat to the German society. In a manifest which was originally published in 1982 it 
was stated that: 
 
The integration of large masses of non-German foreigners is not possible 
without threatening the German people, language, culture and religion. Every 
people, including the Germans, have a natural right to preserve its identity and 
character in its residential areas.229 
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Such anti-immigrant feelings have been prevalent among the German society 
since the mid-1970s. The anti-immigrant sentiments increased even more with the 
German Reunification which brought a “wave of ethnocentrism and xenophobic 
aggression”.230 In addition, the 9/11 attacks reinforced the skepticism about the Islamic 
roots of the Turkish community. These anti-immigrant feelings influence the public 
preference formation towards Turkey, and cause an increasing opposition to Turkish 
membership.  
 
The other issue that drives public opposition to Turkish membership is the 
human rights record of Turkey. Turkey is required to improve its human rights record 
significantly to become a member of the EU. In Eurobarometer 66, when asked about 
their most important values, most of the respondents listed peace and the human 
rights.231 The respect for human rights has been incorporated into the definition of the 
European identity. Even though, it has implemented some legal measures such as the 
abolition of the death penalty to improve its human rights record and to comply with the 
Copenhagen criteria, according to the annual progress reports of the European 
Commission, Turkey still has a long way to go. The majority of the German 
respondents expressed that in order to become an EU member; Turkey has to improve 
its human rights record substantially. The survey question was: 
 
• To join the EU in about ten years, Turkey will have to respect 
systematically Human Rights. (Eurobarometer 66, QA34.7) 
 
93% of the respondents agreed with this statement, while only 4% disagreed. According 
to the survey results, the concerns about the human rights in Turkey override the 
concerns about the economic and cultural concerns of the German respondents. 
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Figure 4.1 Eurobarometer 66 results 
As abovementioned, another founding stone of the European identity is assumed 
to be the common historical heritage among the European countries. Turkey does not 
share the historical heritage as the EU member states, and this seems to be another 
motive for the opposition to Turkey’s membership at the public level. 60% of the 
German respondents disagreed with the statement that “Turkey partly belongs to Europe 
through its history”.232  
 
In short, the German public oppose to Turkish membership because they assume 
that the inclusion of Turkey will pose cultural and religious threats. The differences in 
its culture, religious roots and historical heritage distinguish Turkey from the EU 
member states. With its divergent culture and Islamic roots, Turkey is still defined as 
the other in the European collective identity. The existing Turkish community in 
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Germany also reinforced the perceived differences between the Turkish and the 
European collective identity. The Turkish immigrants have been regarded as too 
different in terms of culture and religion to be integrated to the German society. Their 
full integration has been perceived as a threat to the German culture and way of life. 
The integration problems and the anti-immigrant sentiments which gathered speed in 
the aftermath of the German Unification are reflected on the attitude of the German 
public towards Turkey. In addition to the perceived cultural and religious threats, the 
human rights record of Turkey is another determinant that influences the public opinion. 
Turkey is required to improve respect for human rights significantly to become an EU 
member.  
 
Conclusion: 
 
The German public attitude towards Turkey’s EU membership is shaped by a 
combination of utility-driven and identity-based concerns. The utility-based concerns 
concentrate on the possible impacts of Turkey’s inclusion on the socioeconomic 
situation of individuals and the national economic situation. Turkey’s accession is 
perceived as a threat on the job, income and social security benefits of German workers. 
Because of the liberalization of the labor and capital markets, which enables the free 
movement of workers and capital, it is assumed that if Turkey becomes a member, high 
levels of Turkish workers will immigrate to Germany, threatening the jobs and income 
of the German workers. Turkey will be a source of unskilled and cheap labor. The 
immigration of Turkish workers to Germany will increase the level of unemployment 
for German workers and decrease the wages. Particularly, the workers with lower levels 
of income, education and occupational skills worry about the Turkish membership, 
because they will be affected by the immigration of Turkish workers more than the 
people with higher education, occupational skills and income. In addition to these 
individual concerns, Turkey is also perceived as a threat on the national economy. The 
costs of Turkey’s inclusion will be high considering its economic level. The costs of 
enlargement are mainly paid by the net contributors to the EU budget. Considering that 
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Germany is the largest net contributor to the EU budget, Turkey’s inclusion is regarded 
as a burden on the German national economy, as well. The concerns about the current 
employment and economic situations in Germany and the pessimism about the future 
also influence the German public opinion on the Turkish issue. As for the identity-based 
concerns, cultural differences between Turkey and the EU member states are considered 
too important to allow for Turkey’s accession. Due to its divergent culture, social norms 
and values, religious and historical roots, and the human rights record, Turkey is not 
perceived a part of Europe. The role of the Turkish immigrants in Germany and the 
prevalent anti-immigrant sentiments play a significant role in shaping the public attitude 
both in terms of utility-driven and identity-based concerns. 
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CHAPTER V 
Conclusion 
Societal groups impact state-level preference formation in EU-related issues. 
The pressure of the domestic groups on the national governments has especially been 
manifest in regards to Turkey’s long-standing EU bid. This thesis aimed to investigate 
the influence of the societal groups on the national preference formation on the Turkish 
issue in Germany. Germany is one of the most influential member states of the EU; 
therefore the support of Germany for Turkish membership is crucial for Turkey. 
Besides, considering the change in Germany’s supportive attitude towards Turkey’s 
accession in the late 1980s, which was mainly facilitated by the increasing opposition 
among the domestic groups, Germany forms a good case study to show the impact of 
the societal groups on the state-level preference formation. Turkey’s attempts to become 
a part of the European system had been constantly supported by Germany until the late 
1980s. However, this supportive attitude of Germany was replaced by opposition to 
Turkey’s EU membership. The domestic groups were influential in the shift in 
Germany’s attitude among other factors, such as the paradigm shift engendered by the 
end of the Cold War.  
 
Two domestic groups have been identified that impact the national preference 
formation in Germany, namely the political parties and the public. Both groups 
influence the decision-making on the Turkish issue to some extent. However, the 
political parties have a larger and more direct impact on national preference formation 
than the public. Particularly when these parties are in the government, their impact on 
the Turkish accession becomes more manifest. The ups and downs in German 
governments’ attitude towards Turkey’s membership illustrate this point further. The 
public opinion, on the other hand, is likely to affect the government’s decision-making 
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through means of political representation, mainly via elections. The decisions related to 
European integration are still to a great extent driven by the elites, and the input of the 
public on these issues is rather limited. The political party leaders and influential 
opinion makers shape the public opinion on EU related issues to a certain degree.233 The 
public opinion only gains more importance if the majority of the public supports a 
certain policy or pursues the same interest, then the influence of the public on the 
national preference formation is greater. In this sense, the role of the public in the 
formation of Germany’s stance on the Turkish issue cannot be totally underestimated. 
Considering the predominant opposition to Turkish membership, rated as 78% in the 
Eurobarometer 66, the German public opinion matters in defining Germany’s attitude 
towards Turkey’s accession.  
 
In addition to their relative impact on the opinion formation on the Turkish 
membership, the political parties and the public differ from one another in terms of the 
determinants which shape their preferences. The economic and security benefits of 
Turkey’s inclusion play a more significant role in shaping the attitude of the political 
parties. Turkey’s inclusion is perceived as a benefit in terms of its potential contribution 
to European security and economy. In addition, Turkey is regarded highly important for 
the energy security of Europe. On the other hand, these factors are not influential in 
public opinion formation. Public opinion formation is mainly determined by the 
perceived economic and cultural threat of Turkey’s accession.  
 
The impact of the security and economic benefits of Turkey’s membership do 
not affect the stance of the major political parties in the same degree. The major 
political parties, specified as SPD, CDU/CSU, the Greens and the FDP, are divided in 
terms of the determinants that shape preference formation on the issue. The SPD and the 
Greens support Turkish membership ardently. The indispensable role of Turkey in the 
European system with its military capacities, NATO membership, geostrategic location, 
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mediator role are the primary determinants in the preference formation of SPD and the 
Greens, as has been consistently reiterated by the party leaders and influential opinion 
makers. CDU/CSU also emphasize Turkey’s important role in European security and 
economy, however, these concerns are not prioritized in shaping the stance of 
CDU/CSU towards Turkey. The cultural differences between Turkey and the EU 
member states is the central factor which determines the CDU/CSU position in this 
issue. According to this position, Turkey is to be anchored to the security and economic 
system of the EU through a privileged partnership without being included to the 
decision-making mechanisms of the EU. In contrary to CDU/CSU, the ideational 
concerns do not play an eminent role in the preference formation of the SPD and the 
Greens. The stance of the FDP is not yet clear-cut. However, the economic benefits of 
Turkey’s inclusion seem to influence the preference formation among the liberals 
considering the rhetoric of their party leader.  
 
In line with CDU/CSU, the public opinion is considerably shaped by ideational 
concerns. Turkey’s inclusion is perceived as a serious cultural threat to the established 
European identity and culture. The cultural argument against Turkey accesion is mainly 
religion based. The fact that Turkey has a predominantly Muslim population is regarded 
incompatible with the European culture and identity. Christianity is still an important 
element in the formation of the European identity. In this regard, the Muslim roots of 
the Turkish identity do not comply with the Christian roots of the European identity. 
The majority of the German public considers Turkey to be culturally too different to be 
allowed into the EU. The other determinant that shapes public attitude on this issue is 
the economic concerns over Turkey’s accession. In contrary to the state elites, who 
claim that Turkey’s inclusion would be beneficial for the EU in terms of economy, the 
public regard Turkish membership as a threat to their economic well-being. The fear of 
immigration is the bottom-line that triggers such concerns. The public associates 
Turkey’s accession with a flux of Turkish workers into Germany. The economic 
concerns mostly focus on the loss of jobs, income and social security benefits. The 
economic concerns are not solely personal; the inclusion of Turkey is also regarded as a 
burden to the national economy. The fear of immigration is the key factor that 
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stimulates both ideational and economic concerns of the public. Another difference 
between the public and the political parties in the Turkish issue is that the public is more 
skeptical about Turkey’s accession than the political parties. The political parties regard 
Turkey’s inclusion beneficial to a certain degree. Even CDU/CSU, the most skeptical 
parties, accept that Turkey is an indispensable partner of the EU in security matters. 
However, the majority of the public opposes the Turkish membership in Germany, and 
the importance of Turkey for European security and economy do not temper this 
opposition. 
 
Germany’s support is vital for Turkey’s EU bid, since having one of the largest 
member states’ backing will help Turkey considerably to acquire membership. Germany 
is the largest funding state of the EU, and has relative influence over other member 
states through its economic might. Currently, the attitude of Germany towards Turkish 
membership is marked by the increasing opposition at home. Major political parties 
such as CDU/CSU and the majority of the public oppose Turkish membership. 
However, it can be assumed that opposition will not determine the German attitude 
towards Turkey in the long run. All of the major political parties accept that Turkey is 
an asset for European security and economy. In the post-9/11 security paradigm, 
Turkey’s role will become increasingly important. Particularly, if the EU desires to 
become a global actor, Turkey’s military capacities and mediator role will be invoked 
even more. These factors temper the opposition of the major parties like CDU/CSU. 
The rigid opposition of CDU has already been moderated to a certain degree. The 
rhetoric adopted by Merkel and influential opinion leaders emphasizes the importance 
of Turkey for the EU security, and it has been stated by Merkel that the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda will prevail in Turkey’s EU bid. In addition, the opposition of 
CDU/CSU might be tempered by their coalition partner, FDP. FDP party leader made it 
clear that FDP is not to follow the line of CDU/CSU on the Turkish issue. The 
opposition among the public is more likely to prevail, since neither of the factors that 
trigger such opposition is about to change. It cannot be estimated to what extent the 
public opposition will shape the national preference formation on the Turkish issue. The 
public might influence the national preference formation through elections, but whether 
Turkey’s accession is a strong variable that affects vote choice of the domestic voters is 
another question. 
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